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Property’s Constitution 
James Y. Stern∗ 
Long-standing disagreements over the definition of property as 
a matter of legal theory present a special problem in constitutional 
law. The Due Process and Takings Clauses establish individual 
rights that can be asserted only if “property” is at stake. Yet the 
leading cases interpreting constitutional property doctrines have 
never managed to articulate a coherent general view of property, and 
in some instances have reached opposite conclusions about its 
meaning. Most notably, government benefits provided in the form of 
individual legal entitlements are considered “property” for purposes 
of due process but not takings doctrines, a conflict the cases 
acknowledge but do not attempt to explain. 
This Article offers a way to bring order to the confused 
treatment of property in constitutional law. It shows how a single 
definition of property can be adopted for all of the major 
constitutional property doctrines without the calamitous results that 
many seem to fear. The Article begins by arguing that property is 
best understood as the right to have some measure of legal control 
over the way a particular item is used, control that comes at the 
expense of all other people. It then argues that legal rights are a kind 
of private property, and that while courts and commentators can 
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validly invoke property in the context of legal entitlements to 
government benefits—so-called new property—they mistakenly 
believe the property at issue is the good a recipient has a right to 
receive, rather than the legal right to receive it. The Article shows 
that legal rights are the only category of things whose existence 
government can altogether extinguish. For this reason, ownership of 
legal rights is the only kind of property right government can 
terminate without conferring equivalent property rights on others. 
The Article further argues that while due process protection should 
apply whenever a person is denied an asserted property right (a 
deprivation), takings protection should only come into play when 
property rights are transferred from one party to another (a taking). 
Combining these observations, the Article concludes that termination 
of both “new property” rights and old-fashioned in personam legal 
rights should trigger due process but not takings protection. This 
analysis provides theoretical coherence that constitutional doctrine 
currently lacks. It also sheds light on the essential characteristics of 
property rights as a general matter, in order to help theoreticians 
understand more clearly the core structures of property law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Government is instituted no less for the protection of the property, than 
of the persons, of individuals.”1 That at least was the position of James 
Madison, architect of the U.S. Constitution, in his arguments urging its 
adoption. Today, however, the very idea of property—to say nothing of its 
moral standing—is seriously questioned. Property has been declared “an 
essentially contested concept,” a disaster zone on the landscape of legal 
theory.2 A much-cited essay by theorist Thomas Grey, for instance, argues that 
the “concept of property and the institution of property have disintegrated” and 
that property “is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual 
scheme.”3 
Grey and others contend that disaggregating ownership into a “bundle” of 
countless shifting legal relationships between persons undercuts any basis for 
distinguishing property from other rights and denies property any conceptual 
coherence.4 The result, in the words of one scholar, is that “the concept of 
property itself is internally riven, situation-specific, metaphorically impacted, 
and often pragmatically derived and resolved.”5 Or more radically, says 
another, property is no more than “a euphonious collection of letters which 
serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the 
commonwealth.”6 Not everyone agrees, but that only proves the point: what 
property is, if it is anything at all, is a major point of contention. 
Fortunately, these difficulties are not necessarily debilitating in the 
private-law context where the law of property is enforced in the first instance. 
A court hearing a boundary dispute between neighbors, for instance, ordinarily 
need not worry whether the doctrine it applies is a rule of “property” law, so 
long as it is the right doctrine to apply. But labels do matter. In a variety of 
circumstances, classifying a legal question as a “property” issue can have 
significant implications.7 And the basic question “What is property?”—a 
recurring title in the literature of legal theory8—continues to puzzle scholars. 
 
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). 
2. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 51–52 (1988); Hanoch Dagan, 
The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 147–48 (1999); Pey-Woan 
Lee, Inducing Breach of Contract, Conversion and Contract as Property, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
511, 517 (2009); Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1688 (1988); see also Walter Bryce Gallie, 
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (New Series) 167 (1956). 
3. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 74 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
4. See id. at 72–73, 81–82. 
5. Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 
144 (2002); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10–20 
(1977) (contrasting “ordinary” and “scientific” approaches to property). 
6. Wallace Hamilton, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937). 
7. Examples abound. The priority of a claim against a bankruptcy estate depends on whether it 
asserts a property right. The availability of injunctive and other specific relief may depend on whether 
a court thinks of the underlying claim as proprietary. The decision to view an owner’s grant of a right 
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One area in which ascertaining the meaning of property can be especially 
important is the realm of constitutional law. The word “property” appears in the 
Constitution in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9 These provisions 
 
to travel across her land as conveying a property right, on the one hand, or a mere contractual license 
on the other, may affect such questions as whether the grantee may assert the right against subsequent 
owners of the land. A court’s choice among procedural rules—such as those concerning jurisdiction, 
venue, and conflict of laws—often turns on whether a problem is characterized as a property issue. The 
refashioning of landlord-tenant law in the latter half of the twentieth century was justified as a 
reconceptualization of the problem as one of contract, rather than property. A legal claim’s 
assignability, and the availability of relief against interference with a legal relationship by third parties, 
may be influenced by whether property is involved. Subordinating property rights to duties grounded 
in other bodies of law—claims founded on the doctrine of attractive nuisance, for instance—may be 
explained as a reclassification of the underlying legal problems as matters not of property but of some 
other area of law. And of course, countless statutes refer to “property.” See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l 
Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 n.6 (2003) (reserving question whether receipt and provision 
of medical services is “property” for purposes of Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)); Cleveland v. 
United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26 (2000) (licenses to operate video poker machines are not “property” for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, federal mail fraud statute); Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 
(1998) (interference with at-will employment is injury to “property” for purposes of civil rights 
conspiracy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)). 
The meaning of property is no less important to legal theorists. Unjust enrichment scholars debate 
whether their field derives from principles of property law or some other basis. Intellectual property 
scholars discuss whether copyrights, trademarks, and patents are really property at all, to say nothing 
of trade secrets, “hot news,” and the like. And more generally, legal theorists seek to understand what 
property is, the better to appreciate its social and legal function, its normative bases, its proper future 
development, and extension of its concepts into other analogous areas of law. 
 8. E.g., David Bazelon, What Is Property?, in ECONOMICS: MAINSTREAM READINGS AND 
RADICAL CRITIQUES, (David Mermelstein ed., 1970); PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS 
PROPERTY? (Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith trans., 1993); Boudewijn Bouckaert, What Is 
Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775 (1990); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the 
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003); O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 459 (2004). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
The word “property” also appears in Article IV, Section 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power “over 
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State” from which the district constituting 
the seat of government was created). On the relationship between these provisions and the Takings 
Clause, see William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
A number of other constitutional provisions have relatively close relationships with property 
ideas. These include the Patent and Copyright Clause of Article I, Section 8, the Third Amendment’s 
provision that “[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of 
the Owner,” the Fourth Amendment’s recognition of the “right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Constitution’s 
various provisions dealing with the power to tax—especially the Sixteenth Amendment’s treatment of 
income taxation—the (now superseded) slavery clauses, and arguably the Ninth Amendment and the 
Constitution’s two “privileges” and “immunities” clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. A number of other constitutional provisions protect personal wealth or vested rights. 
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting imposition of “excessive fines”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
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give rise to the three major families of constitutional doctrine that explicitly 
concern property: “substantive due process,” “procedural due process,” and 
“takings.”10 These constitutional property doctrines adapt a body of rules 
designed primarily to govern relationships between citizens to a different 
purpose, using them to police the boundaries of lawful government power. And 
since those doctrines are available only when “property” is involved, courts 
seeking to apply them are forced onto the theoretical battlefield where the 
meaning of property is the object of conflict. The result has been a confused 
and schizophrenic collection of decisions and rules in which different bodies of 
constitutional law are set against each other—hardly the fulfillment of 
Madison’s vision. 
The Supreme Court has faced the threshold definitional question most 
squarely in the procedural due process context. In a string of cases decided 
during the 1970s, the Court concluded that a variety of government benefits, 
from welfare aid to government employment, should be considered property for 
purposes of procedural due process.11 But the Court immediately balked at the 
idea of extending takings protection to this so-called “new property.”12 It is not 
hard to see why: if receiving welfare benefits is property, it would seem the 
government must provide “just compensation” if it decides to curtail 
distribution of those benefits. In essence, an entitlement program could not be 
repealed or even modified once adopted, at least for current beneficiaries. That 
result seems inconsistent both with the Constitution’s emphasis on negative 
rights—prohibitions on government action as opposed to requirements that the 
government provide affirmative benefits13—and with the managerial flexibility 
 
10 (forbidding states from passing any law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts”). A catalog of the 
Constitution’s economic components might be as long as the Constitution itself. 
10. Substantive due process doctrine protects property rights from what are considered unjust 
grounds of alteration. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (a punitive damages 
award “grossly excessive” in relation to a state’s interests in allowing such damages falls within a 
“zone of arbitrariness” inconsistent with due process). Procedural due process doctrine requires that 
certain procedures be followed before terminating or denying a property right. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (describing procedural due process requirements). Takings 
doctrine requires the government to have a public purpose to justify taking property from others and 
that it compensate those from whom the property is taken. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 479 (2005) (describing public use requirement); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 
231–32 (2003) (setting forth two components of Takings Clause). 
11. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1978) (gas and 
electric service); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–34 (disability benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 
573–74 (1975) (public school attendance); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972) 
(government employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare benefits); see 
also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
12. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (“[T]he analogy drawn in 
[Goldberg] between social welfare and ‘property,’ cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional 
limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public 
benefits.”) (internal citation omitted); see also infra note 152. 
13. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118–72 (1969) 
(distinguishing between negative and positive ideas of liberty). 
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needed to administer social welfare policies effectively.14 Perhaps most 
troublingly, it commits the Constitution to a potentially impossible position. 
After all, the money simply may not be there. If an entitlement program must 
be pared back because it is insolvent, it makes little sense to require the 
government to compensate beneficiaries for benefits it could not afford to 
dispense in the first place.15 It should come as no surprise that democratic 
governments make pledges to their peoples that prove impossible to keep. In 
reality, every statutory entitlement program promising benefits in the abstract—
just like every unsecured debt and uncollected judgment—carries the implicit 
caveat “while supplies last.” 
It is odd for “property” to mean different things for takings and due 
process purposes.16 In the context of challenges against the federal government, 
the Takings and Due Process Clauses occur in the same sentence of the Fifth 
Amendment, and in the context of challenges against state governments, the 
Takings Clause applies only because it is said to be incorporated as a 
component of the states’ due process obligations.17 Yet it seems unlikely either 
that takings protection will be extended to new property or that due process 
protection for new property will be eliminated any time soon. We are left, then, 
with conflicting commitments. Due process property should include 
government benefits, takings property should not, and both should define 
property the same way. Something has to give. 
To date, there has been no satisfactory treatment of these important issues. 
The Supreme Court has attempted to settle the matter by fiat, simply declaring 
without explanation that due process protects more property than takings.18 In 
an influential article published a decade ago, property theorist Thomas Merrill 
took issue with the Court’s failure to address the definition of property in a 
coherent way.19 But while Merrill’s diagnosis of the Court’s doctrinal ailment 
 
14. Administrators may need to rework eligibility rules to prevent fraud, for instance. 
15. One might argue the government can escape the conundrum by raising taxes, but even 
setting aside objections to what would presumably be tax increases commanded by the judiciary, see 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 58–76 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), raising 
taxes will not necessarily fix the problem. It is possible the government’s obligations would exceed the 
revenues it could obtain from higher taxes. 
16. The Takings Clause refers to “private property,” while the Due Process Clauses refer only 
to “property.” On the significance of this difference, see infra note 74. 
17. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (citing Chi. 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)); cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The 
Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 826, 844 (2006) (arguing that while Penn Central was based on an incorporation conception, 
Chicago Burlington & Quincy was based on a pure due process, rather than an incorporation, 
conception). 
18. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (“[T]he analogy drawn in [Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)] between social welfare and ‘property,’ cannot be stretched to impose a 
constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of 
entitlement to public benefits.”) (internal citation omitted). 
19. See Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 
(2000). 
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was accurate, the prescription he supplied was no cure. Merrill ultimately 
responded with not two but three definitions of property, one for each 
constitutional property doctrine.20 Conceding it would be preferable to define 
property consistently for all constitutional purposes, Merrill nonetheless 
rejected such an approach out of concern that it could not “accommodate 
settled doctrine” or produce “normatively defensible” results.21 
In this Article, I seek to demonstrate that such fears are misplaced. 
Drawing on core ideas of property theory, this Article develops a conception of 
property that can be reconciled with the thrust of modern constitutional 
doctrine and the intuitions that appear to underlie it. The goal here is partly to 
resolve the apparent inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
government benefits but also to provide a general definition of property that 
can guide resolution of other problems that implicate the Constitution’s 
property clauses. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I develops a general account of 
property by focusing on the basic function property law plays and the form 
property rights assume as a result of that function, irrespective of normative 
concerns that shape the particulars of how that function is carried out. It argues 
a property right should be understood as a right conferring some measure of 
legal authority to determine how a particular thing may be used—authority that 
comes at the expense of all others asserting authority over the thing. It is a legal 
right that centers on conduct pertaining to a particular, identifiable item, 
resource, or asset and that operates against the world generally. 
Part II uses this understanding to make some additional observations 
about property as a formal institution of law. First, all individual rights—
property rights or otherwise—are a kind of private property. The holder of the 
right has a property right in the right she holds—that is why her rights are hers. 
Second, the only way one person can lose a property right without someone 
else gaining it is if the underlying property ceases to exist. Property law treats 
the world as a zero-sum game as a formal matter: one person’s loss of rights in 
a particular thing is necessarily another’s gain if—but only if—the thing itself 
still exists after the first person loses her property right. Third, in personam 
legal rights—legal rights that are not property rights—are the only kind of 
privately owned things whose existence can be extinguished by legal process. 
Taken together, these three propositions suggest that, generally speaking, the 
only property rights that can be terminated without being transferred to 
someone else are those one holds by virtue of being the owner of an in 
personam right. 
Part III shows how the conundrum that has led to a fractured 
understanding of constitutional property can be avoided by incorporating these 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 956. 
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insights into constitutional doctrine. Although the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses both protect the same legal relationship when they protect rights of 
“property,” the actions they protect those rights against—deprivations and 
takings—differ. A deprivation should be understood to occur whenever an 
asserted property right is denied, but a taking should be understood to include 
only the transfer of a property right from one person to another. If a person 
loses a property right and the right does not then shift to the government or to 
another private party, the person has been deprived of property but has not 
suffered a taking. An interpretation of the Due Process and Takings Clauses 
along these lines would mean that the withdrawal of in personam legal rights 
always triggers due process protection, but only amounts to a taking if the right 
is transferred to someone else and not simply extinguished. When rights in 
personam are extinguished, ownership of them does not shift to someone else, 
for the simple reason that there is nothing left to own. Thus, although the 
government’s decision to abrogate positive in personam rights does deprive 
claimants of property, implicating due process protections, it does not 
constitute a taking. The claimants lose their rights, but no one else gains them. 
Courts and commentators addressing constitutional property questions 
have confused themselves by thinking of new property entitlements as property 
rights, rather than as items of property to which property rights attach. It is not 
the abstract vision of whatever good the government has promised to provide—
cash, medical services, housing, and so on—that constitutes property, but the 
valid legal claim to have those benefits provided. The beneficiary owns the 
legal right created by the state’s promise to provide those goods, not the goods 
themselves. Seen this way, the “new property” is not really new at all. It is 
simply a modern manifestation of the venerable notion that a person has 
property in his legal rights. 
From a practical standpoint, the bottom line under this analysis is that 
takings protection is always available when rights in rem are at issue22—
assuming no other doctrine limiting what counts as a compensable taking 
comes into play—but in cases where rights in personam are at stake, takings 
protection is available only when the rights are reassigned or transferred, rather 
than extinguished outright. And because “new property” entitlements typically 
look more like rights in personam than rights in rem, they receive only the 
limited takings protection applicable to contractual and other in personam legal 
relations. Due process protection, however, extends to the invasion of any legal 
right, notwithstanding the form of the right or the nature of the infringement. 
This analysis should prove helpful in a number of respects, not least in its 
ability to make sense of current doctrine and provide an account of property to 
help resolve constitutional property problems in the future. It also generates 
some potentially surprising results. Government action with respect to new 
 
22. Excluding, of course, rights in rem where the res is a right in personam. 
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property may indeed support a takings challenge if it transfers an entitlement 
from one person to another, rather than terminating it altogether. At the same 
time, government actions that impair certain valuable common-law-style 
private rights might not support a takings claim, as where the government voids 
an unsecured contract claim. This is a reminder that property law is addressed 
first and foremost to the issue of control over particular things, rather than the 
distribution of material wealth. At least when it comes to defining the 
institution of property itself, the Constitution need not side with either the night 
watchman or the welfare state, only with the neutrality associated with playing 
by the rules. 
I. 
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY 
A. Starting Parameters 
Given the controversies that attend constitutional interpretation, it is 
appropriate to begin with a few words about methodology. The approach 
followed here emphasizes property’s formal characteristics when considered as 
an organizing concept of private law. I do not claim this approach produces 
results that best reflect the original intentions of the drafters or ratifiers of the 
Constitution’s property clauses or the plain meaning of the relevant 
constitutional language, either today or at the time of adoption. Text and 
original meaning are nonetheless relevant. This Article seeks at the very least to 
avoid an interpretation that would contradict a generous construction of the 
Constitution’s language. More generally, it aims to accommodate text and 
context to the maximum extent possible given other, admittedly significant 
interpretive commitments. Those additional commitments are precedent—at 
least to the extent it appears likely to remain in force—and theoretical 
consistency. The goal is to make sense of the law we have, broadly speaking, 
reconciling competing sources of legal authority where necessary, and making 
them cohere in some significant measure. 
In pursuing an interpretation of this kind, moreover, this Article seeks to 
avoid taking sides in arguments over property law’s moral foundations or the 
justice of any particular property regime. It strives to understand property in 
light of characteristics that transcend different modes of administration or 
normative visions, whether Lockean, utilitarian, Hegelian, Marxist, and so 
forth, that undergird property law. Of course, whatever account is ultimately 
produced can be assessed in normative terms. But the goal is to avoid relying 
on such judgments in determining what constitutes the legal practice we call 
property. 
Before undertaking an analysis of property as a conventional legal 
institution, it is useful to note a few guideposts established under existing 
doctrine that will frame the inquiry. The Constitution uses the word “property” 
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in the provisions discussed here, but the word can be used in a number of 
different, though related, ways. Property can refer to a particular thing—
Blackacre, for instance—whose legal status the law of property addresses. It 
can also refer to individual rights concerning such a thing, especially ownership 
rights, and to a thing’s status as the object of those rights. And it can refer to 
the law of property as a whole. At various points, this Article deploys the term 
in each of those senses. 
Constitutional usage is more precise, however. The Constitution’s use of 
the word property has quite properly been read to refer to property rights,23 a 
term whose meaning is explored in the next two Sections. The Constitution 
directs its attention to certain actions that contravene rights established within 
the law of property, not to the underlying assets those rights concern. In other 
words, the Constitution protects not physical possession of a thing, but legal 
rights pertaining to that thing. Those rights commonly include a right of 
physical possession, but not always. Thus, for example, there is no violation of 
property rights if government agents take possession of stolen government 
property from a thief who admits to having stolen it.24 Conversely, if 
government declares that a tenant is the owner of the property he or she leases, 
the landlord may well have a constitutional claim, even though the landlord had 
no present right of possession.25 Possessory rights are among those rights 
protected as property by the Constitution, but possessory rights are not 
necessary, and unlawful possession is not sufficient, to constitute property in 
the constitutional sense. 
In terms of the source of property rights, it is black letter law that “the 
Constitution protects rather than creates property interests,” and that whether a 
person has a property right protected by the Constitution “is determined by 
reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.’”26 This statement requires further elaboration, 
however. The existence of a property right does not depend simply on whether 
some other body of law uses the term “property” or declares that a person has a 
 
23. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (“It is conceivable 
that [the term ‘property’] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with 
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been 
employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the 
phrase has been the latter.”).  
24. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1236 (1967) (arguing that 
“[w]hen theft occurs, society usually will do what it can to make the thief restore to the owner the thing 
stolen or its equivalent” and that the “whole point of society’s intervention negates any claim to 
compensation”).  
25. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1984) (upholding against “public 
use” challenge a state law transferring title in real property from lessors to lessees). 
26. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
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“property right.” As with a number of areas of federal law that attach 
consequences to “property” but do not purport to create property themselves,27 
the Constitution’s property clauses call for a means of classifying the legal 
relationships that other legal sources create. The Constitution’s reference to 
“property” implies a set of criteria for drawing lines between different kinds of 
rights, benefits, or statuses conferred by antecedent or external legal sources. If 
external sources of law create a legal relationship satisfying those criteria, a 
person has a property right. The criteria are defined by the Constitution, but the 
legal relationship to which they are applied is not.28 
A few other preliminary points: first, the sources of constitutional 
property are not restricted to only the most formal legal directives. When 
government appropriates private property, it cannot escape the Due Process or 
the Takings Clauses by characterizing its action as an unlawful (but 
unremediable) infringement of property rights, as opposed to a transfer of rights 
from the owner to itself.29 Second, however, constitutional property is 
exclusively concerned with property as a legal matter—that is, with property 
rights arising under positive law—and not as a matter of moral or natural law or 
purely social custom. The Constitution has not been read to require the federal 
government or the government of any state to create property rights where none 
existed before. Nor has the Constitution been read to prevent the creation and 
allocation of legal property rights in a manner contrary to preexisting social 
practices. Third, constitutional property doctrine centers on changes in property 
rights—the Due Process and Takings Clauses both protect against certain 
alterations to existing allocations of property rights. The larger constitutional 
problem thus involves not one but two property questions: it must be 
determined both how property rights were allocated prior to the government’s 
challenged action and how they were allocated after it.30 Due process and 
 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (construing “property” for purposes 
of 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien statute); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) (construing 
“property” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 547, provisions of bankruptcy code). 
28. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 927; Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 
62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 435 (1977). 
29. This is not to suggest that remedial limitations like sovereign immunity cannot apply to 
claims arising out of the Constitution’s property clauses. Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) (stating that “it is the 
Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking”). It is 
only to say that a de facto abrogation of a property right is equivalent to a de jure abrogation, and that 
legal rights can be established through comparatively informal means. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (stating that “an unwritten ‘common law’ in a particular university that certain 
employees shall have the equivalent of tenure” would satisfy the requirement of property for 
procedural due process purposes). 
30. This can be somewhat confusing because property rights are partly defined in terms of 
time. The kind of alteration with which the Constitution is concerned is a difference at two different 
points in time in who has rights in a particular property as of some fixed point or period in time, not a 
difference at two points in time in who has rights in a property applicable at those two different 
respective moments. Whether A has a present property right in Blackacre at Time 1 and Time 2 is 
irrelevant. What matters is whether, at Time 1, A had been granted a property right in Blackacre during 
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takings doctrine are both in an important sense about retroactivity. Finally, this 
Article deals principally with the identification of “property” and only 
incidentally concerns the nature and extent of the constitutional protection 
property receives. The Article therefore will not address thorny issues 
concerning, for example, the degree of impairment to property rights necessary 
to constitute a “taking,”31 the meaning of the “public use” and “just 
compensation” requirements, or the procedures that are “due” when a person is 
deprived of property. 
The basic question, then, is what the telltale characteristics of a property 
right are—what must the law do to confer upon a person a property right? Here, 
established doctrine provides a much less satisfying guide. In the context of due 
process claims, the Supreme Court has said property is established by a 
claimant’s demonstrating “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to receive a 
particular benefit from government, but not by showing a merely “abstract need 
or desire” to receive the benefit or a “unilateral expectation” of doing so.32 This 
means the benefit must not be a matter of administrative discretion but a claim 
of right.33 And not only must provision of the benefit be legally obligatory, but 
the beneficiary must be offered some mechanism by which to request or 
perhaps to demand that it be provided.34 In addition, the Court has suggested a 
benefit must have “some ascertainable monetary value”—an idea taken from 
Merrill’s constitutional property article—and has stated that the benefit derived 
from active enforcement of the law against others is not a form of constitutional 
property.35 On at least one occasion, moreover, the Court has stressed the 
importance of “the right to exclude others” and of an “interest over which” a 
person has “exclusive dominion”36—statements suggestive of traditional 
common law property ideas. This doctrinal framework was initially developed 
 
Time 2 (a future interest, in other words), and whether, at Time 2, A no longer has that right and has 
lost that right in a manner inconsistent with any provisions for divestiture provided within the terms of 
the right.  
31. The approach to understanding what it means for “private property” to be “taken” 
developed here is a floor, establishing minimum definitional requirements for a taking. Whether it is 
also a ceiling or whether instead a taking requires some additional qualitative assessment or 
proportionality review, is a question on which this Article takes no position. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–14 (1922). 
Compare Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
57–62 (1985) (arguing any infringement takes property), with Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal 
Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 
1674–78 (1988) (arguing against such “conceptual severance”). 
32. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
33. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761–64 (2005). 
34. See id. at 765–66. 
35. See id. at 767–68. 
36. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999). 
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in procedural due process cases, but the Court has since applied it to 
substantive due process claims as well.37 
With respect to takings claims, the Supreme Court has articulated no test 
for identifying property. While the Court has emphasized the importance of a 
“right to exclude,” it has done so in the context of determining whether 
property was “taken,” not whether there was property at issue in the first place. 
Further, the Court has not limited the Takings Clause to situations in which a 
right to exclude others is impaired.38 Although the right to exclude is 
considered “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property,”39 and “perhaps the most fundamental of 
all property interests,”40 it evidently is not the only right that could be 
characterized as a property right. 
Beyond this, there are simply holdings. On the one hand, the Court has 
said government benefits are not property for takings purposes, though it has 
not explained why or made any attempt to account for its contrary conclusion 
in the due process context.41 The Court has also rejected the claim that a right 
to acquire property, at least by eminent domain, is a property right.42 On the 
other hand, the Court has not hesitated to classify traditional ownership 
interests, especially ownership of land, as property. It has also recognized 
easements,43 security interests,44 and leaseholds45 as sufficient to create 
property rights.46 And in terms of the object of property relations, the Court has 
 
37. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748; see also Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. 666 (not distinguishing 
between procedural and substantive due process); Merrill, supra note 19, at 997 (describing College 
Savings as a substantive due process case). 
38. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Some capacious understandings of the “right to exclude” might see 
regulatory takings cases—cases concerning laws restricting permissible uses of property—as 
infringing the owner’s right to exclude. But I am here using the phrase in its more conventional (and, I 
would maintain, helpful) sense of a right to forbid someone else’s use of a particular resource. 
39. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
40. Lingle, 544 U S. at 538. 
41. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987) (stating that government action that could 
lead to receipt of fewer welfare benefits is not a taking given the “unquestioned premise” that 
government may reduce welfare benefits generally); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 
(1980) (“There is no claim here that Congress has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 
since railroad benefits, like social security benefits, are not contractual and may be altered or even 
eliminated at any time.”); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (rejecting the claim 
that termination of Social Security benefits denied an “accrued property right” in violation of due 
process, notwithstanding dissent’s objections that the action took property without just compensation); 
id. at 621–22 (Black, J., dissenting). 
42. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276–81 (1943). 
43. United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961). 
44. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596–602 (1935); see also United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 
70, 75 (1982). 
45. E.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473–75 
(1973); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
46. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 377–78. The Takings Clause  
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treated items including tangible goods,47 income produced by monetary 
funds,48 and federal contracts as property.49 But many important questions 
remain unresolved. The status of intellectual property rights—trademarks, 
copyrights, and patents—as takings property, for instance, is uncertain.50 It is 
likewise unclear whether imposing general personal liability unconnected with 
any particular asset could constitute a taking of “property.”51 A court 
confronted with a takings challenge involving a novel property rights claim of 
property rights would find little in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence to 
guide the way. 
This, then, is the unhappy state of constitutional law as it presently stands: 
The Court tells us “[t]he hallmark of property . . . is an individual entitlement 
grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’”52 It also 
tells us “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude 
others.”53 The Court says it has “never held that a physical item is not 
‘property’ simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value.”54 It 
later declares that even its prior decisions extending constitutional protection to 
government benefits “implicitly required” that a right “have some ascertainable 
monetary value” to be considered property.55 In the due process context, the 
basic test of property established in the 1970s is occasionally joined by 
 
deals with what lawyers term the individual’s ‘interest’ in the thing in question. That 
interest may comprise the group of rights for which the shorthand term is ‘a fee simple’ or it 
may be the interest known as an ‘estate or tenancy for years,’ as in the present instance. The 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. 
Id. at 378. 
47. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960); United States v. Russell, 80 
U.S. 623, 628 (1871). 
48. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980); Phillips v. 
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998). 
49. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (stating that, under Lynch, “valid contracts are property within meaning of 
the Taking Clause”). 
50. Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of 
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690 (2007). Compare Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002), and Hartford-Empire Co. v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 386, 387–88 (1945), with Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
51. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 548 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with four dissenters that imposition of general liability does not constitute a taking of property); see 
also Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the 
Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207, 215 (2008) (discussing precedential effect of 
Apfel). 
52. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982). 
53. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
54. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169 (1988). 
55. Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. at 673, (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 
(1979)). 
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additional requirements making what appear to be cameo appearances.56 In the 
takings context, there are no established criteria for identifying property. And 
the same legal relationship changes from property to not-property depending on 
which provision of the Fifth Amendment—or which valence of the very same 
clause of the Fourteenth—is being invoked. 
One might admit defeat at this point and simply attempt to define property 
as a matter of constitutional function, asking what the respective purposes of 
the Constitution’s property doctrines are and working backward to derive 
different threshold criteria for each doctrine.57 In large measure, that is the 
approach Merrill takes in The Landscape of Constitutional Property, which 
remains the most comprehensive attempt to bring order to the chaos of current 
doctrine. In that article, Merrill offers three different concepts of property: 
“ownership” for takings law,58 “entitlement” for procedural due process,59 and 
“wealth” for substantive due process.60 The project has been influential, not 
only with scholars, but with the Court.61 
Merrill’s heroic attempt at synthesizing constitutional doctrine is not 
without some basis in theory—no surprise since Merrill is one of the leading 
property theorists in American law. Ownership, entitlement, and wealth are 
certainly related to property as a legal and social institution. But their 
connections to property are obscure, for Merrill frankly abandoned any real 
attempt to justify his three definitions as a matter of property theory. How 
could he do otherwise? Property theory might point to a number of possible 
conceptions of property, but it cannot itself tell us why one conception is 
appropriate for takings and another for due process. Merrill’s basic rationale 
was not that these definitions made sense as an understanding of property, but 
that they are more or less consistent with existing doctrine and, more 
importantly, produce results that jell with the purposes or norms underlying the 
different constitutional property doctrines.62 
 
56. Compare Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. at 673 (emphasizing “right to exclude”), with Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 765–68 (2005) (making no reference to such a right but suggesting the need 
for ascertainable monetary value, power to request or demand compliance with legal entitlement, and 
directness of the benefit secured by entitlement). 
57. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 960–87. 
58. Ownership for Merrill means that “nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable 
right on the claimant to exclude others from specific assets.” Id. at 969.  
59. Entitlement means “nonconstitutional sources of law confer on the claimant an entitlement 
having a monetary value that can be terminated only upon a finding that some specific condition has 
been satisfied.” Id. at 961. 
60. Wealth means “nonconstitutional sources of law confer an entitlement on a claimant 
having a monetary value.” Id. at 987. 
61. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766 (quoting Merrill); see also id. at 791 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
62. Although Merrill professed to take precedent as his starting point, the fact that he would 
define property differently for substantive and procedural due process purposes, notwithstanding the 
Court’s use of the same definition for both, suggests constitutional functionalism is his primary 
desideratum. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 987–88. 
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There are good reasons to avoid this kind of constitutional purposivism if 
alternatives are available.63 The ends the constitutional property doctrines ought 
to serve are contested. They can be described at varying levels of generality. 
And arguably they cannot be understood without defining property in the first 
place, since it is property that the doctrines exist to protect. That is not to say 
the doctrines’ purposes are irrelevant, but it is important not to place too much 
weight on what are necessarily vague and high-level commitments. Moreover, 
an approach in which constitutional goals drive the analysis accords little 
weight to the idea of “property” as a legal concept, reducing it to something of 
a placeholder for whatever normative content an interpreter might wish to 
insert.64 Why define property in light of due process, after all, rather than due 
process in light of property?65 
“Property,” both at the Framing and now, is a vital concept in ordinary—
that is, nonconstitutional—law. Before abandoning inquiry into “property” as a 
routine legal institution, it is worth considering whether something resembling 
its usual meaning can be profitably adapted for constitutional uses and taken 
seriously as a legal term. As I shall argue, an examination of ordinary property 
law that focuses on the analytic form of property rights can supply a coherent 
and workable approach to the problem of constitutional property. 
B. The Function of Property Law 
Property law’s basic function is to allocate legal authority over resources. 
As a result of that function, property rights assume a distinctive form: they 
pertain to specific things and they are “good against the world.” In other words, 
they are rights “in rem.” To understand the relationship between the function 
and form of property rights, it is necessary to examine property law’s elemental 
role within a legal system. 
Law resolves human conflict by imposing rules that govern how human 
beings must act toward one another. It creates and shapes normative 
relationships between people. Many of these relationships are essentially 
personal. They establish a direct bridge of legal obligation between two people. 
A parent must provide for his or her child; a debtor must repay her creditor; an 
 
63. Merrill’s stated desire to “make sense of the landscape of constitutional property in the 
wake of the Court’s recent pronouncements” is one that I share. See id. at 890. Where I disagree with 
him is over the best way to go about “mak[ing] sense” of the data supplied by decisional law. See id. at 
955 (expressing concerns about definitions that produce “too much or too little property”); see also id. 
at 958–59, 987–88 (defending separate substantive due process definition of property despite contrary 
case law). 
64. See Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1923, 1932 (1997) (noting that in their accounts of the Takings Clause, both Frank Michelman and 
Joseph Sax “see through ‘property’ and construe the Takings Clause as being about something else—
economic value or welfare”). 
65. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539–41 (1985) (“‘Property’ 
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation.”). 
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employer must deal fairly with its employees; a railroad must not risk injury to 
foreseeable victims; and so on. 
But the universe consists of more than human beings. It is filled with 
things. Some of these things are composed of physical matter—a chair, for 
instance, or a parcel of land. Others are ideal—a poem, a phone number, a law, 
or a chemical formula. Human beings interact constantly with things of every 
sort. Not surprisingly, much human conflict involves the use of things. 
Sometimes the role of things in human conflict is incidental: hitting someone 
with a baseball bat involves a material thing, but the essence of the conflict is 
not over the use of the baseball bat, at least not the use of any one baseball bat 
in particular. Often, however, there are conflicts involving things more directly, 
the sort of conflicts that arise whenever one person wants a thing used in a 
manner incompatible with the way another person wants it used. 
Incompatibility is meant broadly. Even if A does not have any particular use for 
Blackacre in mind but would simply like B not to use it, A’s and B’s wishes are 
incompatible so long as B would like to use Blackacre. They cannot both 
prevail. The law must take sides. 
This problem is most evident in light of what is termed the “scarcity” of 
resources, but in a sense it goes beyond scarcity.66 Scarcity refers to situations 
where there is not enough of a particular thing to satisfy everyone’s wants. 
There is, for example, a finite amount of physical space on the planet, and 
human desires for space outstrip the Earth’s capacity to provide it. But even if 
there were infinite space, human beings might disagree over what is to be done 
with any particular bit of it. Take for instance intellectual property, considered 
to be “nonrivalrous”—which is more or less to say not scarce.67 “He who 
receives an idea from me,” Thomas Jefferson famously wrote, “receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, 
receives light without darkening me.”68 But while one person’s use of an idea 
may not itself prevent someone else from using the idea in some affirmative 
way, it cannot be reconciled with the other person’s desire to make use of the 
idea by having others not use it. Such a desire might arise from spite, 
contrariness, or opportunism, but it also might have more productive 
motivations: to keep a trade secret confidential in furtherance of long-range 
business plans, to keep a brand name from being used in ways that will 
diminish its cachet, to keep a song from being played in service of a political 
cause with which one disagrees, and so on. Scarcity of resources increases the 
 
66. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 32 (“Scarcity . . . is a presupposition of all sensible talk 
about property . . . . [S]o long as it obtains, individuals (either on their own or in groups) are going to 
disagree about who is to make which use of what.”). 
67. Scarcity refers to a situation in which substitutes for a good are lacking, while rivalry refers 
to the inability of a good to support consumption by multiple people. A good that exhibits a high 
degree of nonrivalry can be thought of as nonscarce because it effectively supplies its own substitute. 
68. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333–34 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907). 
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likelihood of conflict, but even in conditions of superabundance, conflict over 
what may be done with any given thing remains a distinct possibility. 
The rules for resolving such disputes are the law of property. For each 
thing in existence, the law of property tells us who is in charge and to what 
extent as well as who has authority to decide how the thing will be used when 
disputes over use arise. The basic structure of property law is something like 
what parents do when they sew nametags into their children’s clothes before 
sending them to summer camp. Property law affixes a sort of invisible tag to 
every object in the world, naming the person authorized to decide how to use 
the object. There need not be a single name on the tag—B might be empowered 
to make most decisions subject to an exception allowing A to decide some 
particular question or to take over at some particular point in time. The 
permutations can be exceedingly complex. But it is important to recognize the 
sort of conflicts that the law of property addresses—conflicts arising from 
competing claims to control some particular resource—and the way it addresses 
them. Property law tells us who gets to decide how a given resource may be 
used.69 
The approach to conflict resolution reflected in property law is 
fundamentally institutional, in that it focuses on the allocation of authority. 
Property law is primarily concerned not with what so-and-so may or may not 
do with Blackacre, but with who decides what so-and-so may do. It designates 
the person, group of persons, entity or entities with authority to adjudicate 
matters occurring at a particular focal point of human conflict. The basic model 
of property law is in many respects analogous to a jurisdictional approach. It 
assigns a kind of prescriptive jurisdiction over a particular set of activities, 
defining those activities in terms of their relationship to particular external 
things.70 As one’s home is one’s castle, so one’s property more generally may 
be said to be one’s kingdom. 
It is here that the concept of “ownership” comes into play. Ownership 
refers to a general authority to decide how a resource may be used, within the 
basic residuum of situations not otherwise spoken for by general laws.71 It is a 
basic building block of property law. It is ownership to which Blackstone was 
referring when he described property as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
 
69. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138. 
70. That relationship is what we call “use.” Use is something of a term of art, but is often 
defined fairly simply. Where the thing is physical space, a use is an activity occurring within the space; 
where the thing is a tangible item, it is an activity involving physical contact with the item. 
71. For an influential account of ownership, see generally A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in 
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); see also James Harris, Property—
Rights in Rem or Wealth?, in THEMES IN COMPARATIVE LAW 51, 29–32 (Peter Birks & Arianna 
Pretto eds., 2002); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702–14 
(2012) (describing property law’s “exclusion strategies,” according to which “an owner can pursue her 
interest in a wide range of uses that usually need not be legally specified”). 
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exclusion of any other individual in the universe.”72 The archetypical problems 
with which the Constitution’s property clauses are concerned are doubtless 
those in which a person’s rights as owner are infringed, and it is therefore 
useful to have a working conception of what ownership is and how it operates. 
But while ownership will play an important role in this Article, it is not 
the key to the analysis. The Constitution protects “property,” which should be 
understood as embracing property rights,73 a category of relations that includes 
but is not limited to ownership. For purposes of this Article, a property right is 
a right to control some aspect of a particular thing’s use. An easement, for 
instance, is not an ownership right—it does not confer a general power to 
control the burdened property—but it does carve out a slice of the general 
control otherwise vested in an owner. It gives the easement holder the right to 
determine some particular question regarding the use of the subject property. 
That right is a property right. 
Moreover, for purposes of this discussion, property rights are not limited 
to rights associated with private property.74 Access rights to shared or 
commonly held property are property rights, as are governmental rights to 
control individual resources.75 Any allocation of authority to make decisions 
concerning the way a resource may lawfully be used confers a property right on 
the party who receives the authority.76 Private property assigns legal control to 
particular persons on a nonreciprocal basis, concentrating it in a limited set of 
hands. Common or shared property assigns legal control to a larger group of 
people by means of more complex governance devices—voting and consensus 
rules, first-possession or first-actor rules, sharing requirements, charters and 
contracts, and so on. Collective or government property gives legal control to 
government. Each arrangement accomplishes the same basic task, even if the 
way it does so differs radically from its alternatives.77 
 
72. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
73. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
74. Cf. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2004 (2008) (opining that a 
“feature of the current property debate that tends to be misleading is the nearly automatic identification 
of the term ‘property’ with ‘private property’ when arguing whether property as an institution has any 
distinctive, inherent features”). The Takings Clause refers not simply to property, but to “private 
property.” Most likely, this reflects the fact that the Due Process Clauses make “person” the object of 
the sentence, while the object of the Takings Clause is “property.” Still, it is possible this linguistic 
difference would preclude the use of the Takings Clause to challenge privatization of a truly public 
commons. Merrill suggests that absence of the word “private” in the Due Process Clauses supports the 
use of different property definitions. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 955–56. I find this unpersuasive. It 
certainly does not support different definitions for purposes of different due process doctrines, and it is 
hard to see why individual legal entitlements or other protections of material wealth are less “private” 
than fee ownership of Blackacre. 
75. Indeed, the Takings Clause has been held to protect property belonging to state 
governments. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 32 (1984); United States v. 
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946). 
76. See WALDRON, supra note 2, at 38–39.  
77. Property is too often described as a “bundle of rights,” but there are legal attributes the 
holder of a property right may acquire that are difficult to characterize as a component of authority 
       
296 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:277 
Property rights are thus the elements out of which the substance of 
property law is made. A property right is the right to have at least some say 
over at least some uses of a particular thing at some point or points in time. It is 
legal authority to govern certain human actions, actions that are defined in 
terms of their relationship to an item or thing—a relationship called a “use.” 
The authority may be broad or narrow, exclusive or shared, infinite, fixed, or 
contingent in duration. It may be accompanied by any number of auxiliary 
rights and remedial mechanisms for its protection and enhancement. But the 
formal unit at the heart of property is the simple right—however qualified, 
contingent, or brief—to decide how a given thing may be used. 
C. The Form of Property Rights 
So far, this Article has created a rough sketch of property as the right to 
control the uses of things, but more should be said about the distinctive form 
property rights take. To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
basic classes of rights: rights “in rem” and rights “in personam.” The 
terminology is ancient in its origins, but it remains current. And it is useful to 
this discussion because it calls attention to the forms of different kinds of 
rights. As used here, rights in rem are property rights, while rights in personam 
are rights that are not property rights.78 All rights are therefore either in rem or 
 
over a resource. Perhaps the least problematic of these is power to control the circumstances in which a 
property right ends and the related ability to transfer a property to someone else. Others include rights 
of quiet enjoyment, benefits “running with the land” unconnected with the use of any particular 
resource (including, for example, the right to have one’s garbage picked up); any obligations owed by 
others requiring affirmative conduct on their part; and any number of duties and liabilities, such as the 
duty to pay taxes or amenability to service of process in the jurisdiction where property is located. The 
mere fact that the package associated with a property right includes a beneficial legal consequence 
does not make the consequence a property right. 
78. Others might draw the line between rights in rem and in personam differently. See, e.g., 
J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23–31 (1997) (“Rights in personam bind only specific 
individuals,” and are distinguished by “whether the duty is in any way specific to particular individuals 
in terms of its content.”); Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 
1 (2011) (stating that the “in rem rights” protected by tort law are not limited to rights of property). It is 
true that rights like the right not to be assaulted (and the corresponding duty not to assault) are 
impersonal in an important sense: all people are generally forbidden to assault others; all people are 
generally entitled not to be assaulted by others. Indeed, in this sense, such rights create a more 
impersonal relationship than those created by property law, for the relationship between property 
holder and property is contingent (and therefore personal or personality based) in a way that the 
relationship between person and self is not. One could well argue that the central preoccupation of 
property law is an attempt to depersonalize the position of the property holder by shifting the analytical 
focus away from the holder and to the property, so as to make the right more like the rights of bodily 
integrity and the like. But there is another way to understand the difference between a personal and an 
impersonal right that looks to whether the right is oriented around a personal interest, on the one hand, 
or an external object on the other. A right centered on a personal interest connects persons directly in a 
way that a right centered on an external object does not, which likely explains why such personal 
interest rights are much less likely to be alienable than rights in things. (Penner agrees that rights in 
rem require an external object, or res, but he includes as such an object “a state of affairs,” such as the 
state of not being assaulted, PENNER, supra, at 28, a characterization I consider unpersuasive—all 
rights concern a state of affairs. Norms, including rights, are “reasons for action,” id. at 6 (citing J. 
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in personam. A right in rem exhibits two distinguishing characteristics: it 
pertains to the use of a particular thing and it avails against the world generally. 
Properly understood, the idea of a right to control the way a thing is used 
implies both of these features, but it is worth describing them in greater detail 
to give a fuller picture of what control means. 
1. Discrete Thing 
A property right, a right in rem, is centrally concerned with some 
particular, singular, discrete thing—a res. It is crucial that the thing be 
identified with enough specificity to exclude any other candidate or substitute 
for the thing. It is the difference between “a building,” in the abstract, and “this 
building.” Property law can assign control only over the latter. A right to 
control “a building” may be quite valuable, at least if we can be assured that a 
particular building will actually be identified at some point. But until the 
identification takes place, the control the right purports to confer is itself 
meaningless.79 A command to “keep out of a building”—not all buildings or a 
building of one’s choosing but some unidentified building—is nonsensical.80 
This specificity reflects an important aspect of what makes property 
unique. Other branches of law ask, “What does this person owe that person?” 
Property law is the reverse. It gives us a “who” for every “what.” As a mode of 
thinking about legal problems oriented around the assignment of decision-
making power, property law begins with the objects over which that power is to 
be exercised. It is therefore concerned with legal control over actual, specific 
items. A right to be paid $5, even if it is a right against every man, woman, and 
child on the face of the earth—a right “good against the world,” in other 
words—is not a property right because there is no actual thing that it gives the 
holder the right to control. When a right is framed only in terms of quantities, 
values, and substitutes of a thing, it secures a mere abstraction, an idealized 
conception of the thing, rather than the thing itself. Because property rights 
distribute control over resources, their central concern is with actual objects, 
 
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1990)), and actions affect states of affairs.). At any rate, I 
agree that rights of bodily integrity and rights of contract are different in kind, and I think neither 
Smith nor Penner would disagree that rights of property and rights of bodily integrity are distinct. 
Whether the in rem/in personam dichotomy should be used to capture the distinguishing features of 
contract or the distinguishing features of property is simply a matter of terminology, at the end of the 
day, and either use seems to me acceptable depending on one’s purposes, so long as it is clearly 
specified. 
79. Cf. James H. Foster, The Transferability of Development Rights, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 
170 n.32 (1981) (stating that “in practical terms, it is unclear how a system of property as general, 
unattached interests could retain the sense of property as particularized, individual control”). 
80. This understanding is reflected in the legal terminology associated with converting in 
personam claims into in rem ones. The law speaks of attachments and liens (literally, ties) upon things 
owned by the person against whom the in personam claim is asserted. The abstract obligation that 
defines the relationship between creditor and debtor, plaintiff and defendant, must eventually be 
tethered to some actual, identifiable asset to implicate the primary concerns of property law. 
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rather than claims to goods or welfare in the abstract. Property law is 
appropriately understood as “the law of things,”81 not the law of 
undifferentiated, partitive “stuff.” 
2. “Good Against the World” 
The second distinguishing feature of a property right is that it is “good 
against the world.” It deals with legal relationships that operate upon, and very 
often concern the conduct of, all other legal actors.82 Because a property right 
designates which person has authority to decide how a particular thing may be 
used, it confers upon that person a right that binds others. That is the nature of 
the authority at stake. Rights in rem are meant to resolve the question of 
authority over property once and for all, and that requires that all other possible 
contenders for authority be considered. This does not imply exclusive authority 
in the sense of either undivided control or control that is broad in scope, only a 
recognition of the mutually exclusive nature of whatever authority any person 
might enjoy compared to anyone else. If A has a 1 percent share in Blackacre, 
no one else can have a 100 percent share.83 
A right concerning a distinct res is not a property right if it is a right only 
against a particular person or set of persons. If A promises to convey Blackacre 
to B next Tuesday, B’s right to have the contract enforced and the property 
conveyed is not itself a property right; the conveyance itself confers a property 
right on B. In and of itself, the right to have the property conveyed does not 
apply to the world at large.84 If it did, it would mean the promise to convey not 
only conferred a contractual right to a conveyance, but actually achieved 
conveyance. So long as the right is understood as executory, however, B 
himself has no rights against trespassers nor, in all likelihood, against others to 
whom A might convey Blackacre, notwithstanding the promise to B. The 
primary legal effect of a contractual obligation is limited to the contracting 
parties. 
 
81. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at Ch. 1; Geoffrey Samuel, Roman Law and Modern 
Capitalism, 4 LEGAL STUD. 185, 192 (1984) (describing how Roman law divided into three categories: 
the “Law of Persons,” “Law of Things or Property,” and “Law of Actions” (remedies)); see also 
Smith, supra note 71. 
82. Cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 712, 718–20 (1917) (distinguishing between “multital” and “paucital” 
rights). 
83. These ideas are developed further in James Y. Stern, Property, Exclusivity, and 
Jurisdiction 21–30 (unpublished manuscript). 
84. Such a distinction traditionally was central to the operation of courts of equity, which 
routinely made personal commands of this sort. Equity was understood only to have jurisdiction in 
personam and could therefore operate in a way that would usually affect rights in rem—matters within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of law courts—but could not actually change allocations of property rights. 
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537 
(1913). 
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There is a useful distinction associated with Roman law between two 
kinds of rights concerning a res: rights in rem (against the thing) and rights in 
personam ad rem (to the thing).85 In contrast to a right in rem, which is a true 
property right, a right ad rem is an essentially personal obligation that happens 
to reference a particular thing in the description of the duty it imposes. The 
different forms have different consequences. A personal right that merely 
happens to refer to a res “will be capable of surviving the loss or disappearance 
of that res,” while a right in rem will not.86 A right in personam ad rem does not 
really refer to actual control over an actual res but to a personal relationship 
defined by an imagined conception of a res. That difference has important 
consequences, one of which is scope of the obligation the right imposes. Only 
the right in rem speaks to the legal status of all persons relative to one another 
and only the right in rem demands that a res be real. Consequently, only a right 
in rem will be secure against the possibility of opposing rights in relation to the 
res or the possibility that the res does not actually exist. 
Now it is possible to give partial answers to the question of actual title, 
rather than personal obligation—to determine only that as between A and B, B 
should get to decide what happens to Blackacre. Indeed that is frequently all the 
law does, at least as a procedural matter.87 But the implications of such a 
judgment are contingent and its usefulness is therefore limited. If it turns out C 
has title to Blackacre, B still gets nothing, notwithstanding a superior position 
in relation to A; B’s rights against A are purely hypothetical. Property law seeks 
to do better—property rights are meant to be complete statements of authority 
concerning a thing. That is why they necessarily implicate the status not of 
some select group of persons vis-à-vis one another but of all persons.88 
These ideas can be seen in operation in leaseholds. The law has at times 
expressed some confusion over how to classify a lease. Does it convey a 
property right or does it merely create a series of personal obligations governed 
by the law of contracts?89 A leasehold seems like a property interest insofar as 
the tenant looks like a sort of miniowner for the term of the lease. She acquires 
 
85. See Lionel Smith, Transfers, in BREACH OF TRUST 121 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 
2002); see also The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U.S. 655, 666 (1900). 
86. PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 49–50 (1989). As Birks 
explains, if “you come under an obligation to give me the cow Daisy,” but Daisy then disappears, “it is 
still not nonsense for me to maintain that you ought to give me Daisy. . . .” Id. at 49. If, however, 
someone has eaten my cake, “I cannot say in the present tense that there is any cake which I still own.” 
Id. at 50.  
87. See Larissa Katz, The Concept of Ownership and the Relativity of Title, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 
191, 193 (discussing view that the common law “recognises degrees of title far short of the ‘complete’ 
title that many think is the hallmark of true ownership”). 
88. See Stern, supra note 83, at 22–23. 
89. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982); Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm 
for Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1569 (1995); Stephen Siegel, Is 
the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance?—A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. URB. L. 649 (1975). 
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some significant rights to control the property’s use, including the right to 
determine who may enter and occupy it and, within certain constraints, how the 
property may otherwise be used. But the tenant’s rights seem contractual 
insofar as the owner is still, after all, the owner, and the scope of the tenant’s 
rights seems to be defined by an agreement, usually in writing. Analyzing the 
problem in terms of the good-against-the-world aspect of property rights 
reveals the source of much of this confusion. The property-contract 
classification seems uncertain because the legal implications of the leasehold 
are uncertain. Does the tenant have a right in rem? If others interfere with rights 
of tenancy, can a tenant bring actions against them directly in the tenant’s own 
name, or is the tenant required either to stand on the landlord’s rights or to have 
the landlord bring enforcement proceedings? 
The difference appears technical. Even if the tenant does not have 
standing to sue for trespass in her own right, she presumably can assert her 
rights under the lease to insist that the owner bring the trespass action.90 As a 
result, people do not pay much attention to such details—whatever the 
intricacies of the relationship between landlord and tenant,91 their combined 
relations add up to a property right, however distributed, which by and large is 
all the rest of the world needs to know. But that particular detail is the essence 
of the property/contract divide, and when we have no sense of how it comes 
out, we have difficulty telling the difference between a kind of junior 
ownership for a term, on the one hand, and a license agreement, on the other.92 
 
90. Cf. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008) (finding 
standing to sue because plaintiffs had property interest in in personam claims assigned to them). 
91. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 831 (2001). 
92. Even if both are said to have a right to sue as a general matter, there must be some means 
of resolving conflicts between landlord and tenant when they disagree over how that right is to be 
exercised; that mechanism will express the real structure of property rights at work. Admittedly, there 
are other features that might be considered in determining whether to classify the relationship as a 
matter of property law. Does the lease bind a landlord’s or tenant’s successors in interest? May the 
tenant transfer his or her rights, and if so, does the tenant remain liable if the transferee fails to abide by 
the lease? Is the tenant entitled to specific performance if, say, the landlord also leases the property to 
someone else? How much may the landlord and tenant customize the rights and duties that form their 
relationship? To a large extent, these are extensions of the in rem versus in personam theme: if a 
leasehold is binding on the world, for example, then a landlord probably should not have the power to 
convey an interest in the property that now belongs to the tenant. In rem classification does not 
demand this consequence: in principle, a nonowner could be permitted to divest an owner of title, as 
sometimes occurs in the case of good faith purchasers for value or holders in due course, who may 
acquire title from a person who does not actually have title himself. But it conforms to the spirit of the 
in rem conceptualization and is probably wise policy as a general matter. See Richard A. Epstein, The 
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (2010) (under “classical liberal conception” of property,” “[n]o transfer of 
rights, either in whole or in part, should do anything to either increase or diminish the rights of the 
original owner against the rest of the world. The arguments in favor of this view do not rest on any arid 
sense of formalism, but reflect deeply practical concerns”). The point I would stress, however, is that 
these kinds of conclusions are consequences of the classification as property or as contract, in rem or in 
personam, rather than causes of the classification. 
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The res-centered and good-against-the-world qualities of property rights 
are related. As we have seen, it is possible to craft a right that has one of these 
characteristics and not the other. But the reason property rights necessarily 
manifest both qualities is that property law’s function is to assign control over a 
res among the universe of legal actors. Property is about authority. Authority 
requires that there be some actual domain where it applies. And within that 
domain, the authority necessarily comes at the expense of all others seeking the 
same authority. The twin characteristics of property derive from its basic 
function and corresponding structure. 
D. Whither Exclusion? 
This discussion has not referred to the “right to exclude,” often cited as 
the essence of a property right, or a private property right in any event, by both 
theorists93 and courts, including the Supreme Court.94 This is intentional, and 
because of the tremendous emphasis the right to exclude is frequently given, 
the reasons for its omission in this account require some discussion. For one 
thing, outside the context of land or other items of property that the nonowner 
could be said to be capable of entering (like a car, for instance), the right to 
exclude is a rather awkward description of the legal position of an owner in 
relation to nonowners. It is a bit unnatural to say Sally “excluded” Bob from 
her briefcase when Sally told Bob he could not borrow it from her. Theorists 
who give pride of place to exclusion really seem to be referring to the right to 
prohibit someone else—typically everyone else—from using a resource. 
But recast as the right to prohibit, the exclusion principle seems quite 
incomplete as an account of property.95 It does not speak to any right on the 
 
93. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 19, at 971; Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967).  
94. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
673 (1999) (stating that “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others”); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (describing right to 
exclude as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights”); Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing right to exclude as “one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”).  
95. Others have departed from the “exclusion thesis” in favor of property conceptions that 
have some resemblance to the ideas advanced here. See Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in 
Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 11, 18–20, 25–26 (2011) (book review) (defining property as “a right to 
determine exclusively the use of a thing”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 
58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 290 (2008) (“Ownership’s defining characteristic is that it is the special 
authority to set the agenda for a resource.”); Mossoff, supra note 8, at 376 (defining property as an 
“integrated unity of the exclusive rights to acquisition, use and disposal”). Nevertheless, there are some 
important differences. The point is not that the right to exclude others is a derivative consequence of an 
individual normative interest in use or agenda setting. The idea of control emphasized here is formal, 
not purposive. Use and exclusion share a common ancestor in the concept of authority; neither derives 
from, nor is superior to, the other. One can have a right to use without a right to exclude and a right to 
exclude without a right to use. I would further stress that this idea differs from the agenda-setting 
notion developed by Katz both because it applies not only to ownership but also to any lesser property 
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part of the right holder to use the property herself.96 The freedom to use an 
asset is obviously an important part of what most property rights confer—
indeed, in some cases it may be just about the only thing a property right itself 
confers. If the right holder has an easement allowing her to cut across her 
neighbor’s property to reach her own, her entitlement is primarily framed only 
in terms of her own use of the property, not use by others.97 No less important 
is the right to license a resource’s use by others (the right to “include”) and to 
impose conditions in doing so. A person with nothing more than the right to 
prevent others from using a particular resource may have practically nothing: if 
such a right were accompanied by a statute categorically forbidding others from 
using the resource, the right to exclude would be almost entirely hollow.98 The 
right to forbid uses by others, to license uses by others, and to use the property 
oneself are each important aspects of property.99 They all derive from a right of 
legal control over a resource, the essence of property, and it is not clear that any 
one of them should be privileged over any other, at least at a conceptual level. 
What is significant about property rights, ownership especially, is not so 
much exclusion as exclusivity. A right to control is most complete and most 
meaningful when it is not shared with others; to the extent control is shared, it 
is, by definition, diminished. Being able to forbid others to use a particular 
thing is a significant aspect of a broader right of control over the way it is used, 
and there may be strategic reasons to give it pride of place in constitutional 
analysis. But it should be understood that the basic idea at the heart of property 
law does not make exclusion property’s sine qua non. 
 
entitlements, see Katz, supra, at 309–10, and because it treats decisions respecting control that the 
holder of such an entitlement makes as conclusive, rather than calling for independent reevaluation of 
whether an alleged infringement of the entitlement holder’s property rights is truly inconsistent with 
the entitlement holder’s stated purpose or agenda for an asset, see id. at 299–303. 
96. One could say that the right to exclude embraces the right to use because it allows the right 
holder to exclude anyone who would prevent her from using the property. While creative, this attempt 
to derive rights of use (privileges, in the Hohfeldian scheme) from claims against others is a rather 
awkward stretch of natural meaning. It is not self-evident, moreover, that a right to forbid uses by 
others would embrace the right to prevent government officials from enforcing general legal rules, 
rules that might well include prohibitions on use by anyone, owner included. 
97. Such a right is constitutionally protected property. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. 
State Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 618 (1935) (finding that a utility company’s right of way is an 
easement protected by the Takings Clause). The easement holder might have the right to forbid others 
from interfering with her liberty, but that right reflects a secondary sort of protection of her primary 
entitlement of use. And it might well extend to conduct by others that does not involve their own use 
of the property but that nevertheless interferes with her ability to do so. 
98. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Right to Exclude, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1835, 1843 (2006) (arguing the right to exclude includes not only a “hermit’s right” to keep 
others out altogether, but must also include, inter alia, a “bouncer’s right” to determine access). 
99. The power to transfer property, another important aspect of property, might be 
characterized as a combination of the right to forbid one’s own use, as well as anyone else’s, other than 
on terms set by the transferee. 
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II. 
SOME PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 
A. Rights as Property 
Before discussing how the understanding of property developed here 
helps make sense of due process and takings doctrines, a few additional 
features and observations with important implications in the constitutional 
context should be noted. The first concerns legal rights. Legal rights are 
“things” in the basic sense of the word.100 We can talk about them, differentiate 
them, and often buy and sell them. They are conceptually distinct from the 
legal identities of their individual holders, in the sense that we can at least 
imagine the possibility that a given right could be assigned to someone other 
than the person who holds it. Legal rights present the problem of allocation and 
are therefore proper subjects of property law.101 Like every other thing whose 
control the law allocates, a legal right is a piece of property, to which property 
rights can and do attach. 
Indeed, all laws are things. A private legal right is really a special kind of 
law owned by an individual citizen, rather than by the government—“a species 
of normative property belonging to the right holder,” in the words of Hart.102 In 
other words, one might say that every law is an item of property; a law taking 
the form of an individual right is an item of private property. What makes a 
right a right is the identity of its owner. To say that A has a claim against B is 
not only to say that B is saddled with some particular obligation, but that A is 
the person to whom the obligation is owed, and not C, D, or anybody else. Thus 
a contractual right—for example, a right to have a $100 debt repaid—is an item 
belonging to the person who holds it. Others might or might not be at liberty to 
interfere with the right holder’s enjoyment of the right by, say, persuading the 
debtor to give them the debtor’s last $100. But at the very least, they may not 
legitimately be treated as the person to whom the debt is owed. On this view, a 
right is a legal relationship—an entitlement—over which the holder has title. 
The “property” dimension of legal rights can get a bit complicated in the 
context of rights that are themselves property rights. The owner of private 
property may be said to own her ownership—a rather confusing proposition. It 
is hard to differentiate between the authority to decide how Blackacre may be 
 
100. That is, an entity or item. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008) (giving 
as a definition “that which exists individually (in the most general sense, in fact or in idea); that which 
is or may be in any way an object of perception, knowledge, or thought; an entity, a being”). 
101. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent 
Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 384 (2009) (stating that “legal claims do reflect the 
doctrinally defined incidents of property—use, destructibility, disposition, exclusion, and, in some 
instances, alienability and heritability—in a number of ways”); see also Olivia A. Radin, Rights as 
Property, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1316, 1318 (2004). 
102. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 185 (1982). 
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used and the authority to decide how that authority is itself to be used. It is 
easier to see the point, however, where property rights do not rise to the level of 
ownership. The holder of an easement pertaining to the property of another 
does not own the property, but she does own the easement. She has only a 
limited measure of control over the property subject to the easement, but she 
has full control over the easement itself—that is, the way in which she will 
exercise whatever rights the easement confers. 
For purposes of this analysis, however, the more salient point is that 
property rights attach even to rights that are not property rights—personal 
rights that do not confer control over how the rest of the world may use a 
particular asset or thing. That does not mean that in personam rights are 
actually property rights after all. It means that the creation of an in personam 
right entails the creation of an additional right in rem, the res being the 
underlying in personam right.103 
B. The Durability and Resilience of Property Rights 
Because of the role property rights play, they exhibit a number of distinct 
features, some of which have already been discussed. Two other related traits—
referred to here as durability and resilience—are important to note. Property 
rights are “durable” in the sense that a valid property right is designed to avoid 
making demands that are logically impossible and that necessarily require that 
the right be ignored or curtailed. This admittedly somewhat cryptic statement 
can be better understood by comparing property rights with in personam rights 
like those created by contracts.104 
Contractual rights are often valid even though they are impossible to 
honor. A person might promise to do something he or she is not capable of 
doing and yet be considered obligated as a matter of contract to fulfill that 
promise—that, after all, is what happens in bankruptcy all the time. Contract 
law does not demand that a promise be capable of fulfillment, at least as a 
general rule. It is left to the law of property, remedies, bankruptcy, and the like 
to clean up the mess that contract law makes and bring contract’s ambitions 
 
103. Hence the conclusion that a cause of action is property for due process purposes. See 
Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U S. 478, 485 (1988); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422, 430–31 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); 
see also Blumenthal, supra note 101, at 373, 416–21 (declaring “[a] lawsuit is property”). At the same 
time, however, a cause of action itself is not a property right, which may explain the decision in 
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 
(1999) (rejecting claim that false advertising by a state government made actionable by the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), violated would-be plaintiffs’ property rights within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause). Cf. Merrill, supra note 19, at 913 (suggesting College Savings contradicts Logan and 
Mullane). 
104. Cf. Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 237, 237 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) 
(explaining why “[f]or durable assets, a property right is . . . much more valuable than a contract right 
having the same content”). 
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down to earth.105 The law of in personam obligations is imaginative. Because it 
is not oriented around real things, it can easily absorb and generate 
impossibilities. This is true even when in personam obligations purport to 
identify an actual res, as in the case of the proverbial contract to convey 
Blackacre—the obligation in personam ad rem. Such obligations are still 
essentially personal ones at their core. They may therefore be impossible to 
realize, as when, for example, a person makes mutually conflicting promises. 
One cannot convey ownership of the same property twice, but one can promise 
to do so as many times as one likes to as many people as one likes.106 
As the comparison to conveyance suggests, property law is more realistic. 
The need to domesticate impossible claims is the organizing idea of property. 
In principle, property rights do not conflict—any apparent or prima facie 
overlap between property rights is a matter that the law of property must 
resolve. Property law never imagines that completely exclusive, undivided title 
to property can be vested in two different people at the same time. Likewise, 
property law will not knowingly award property rights in a thing that does not 
exist.107 It cannot, for example, conceive of awarding rights in the fabled city of 
Atlantis. It can award a contingent title so that A will own Atlantis if Atlantis 
turns out to be a real place and is discovered. It can award title in the idea of 
Atlantis, so that A is entitled to control depictions of Atlantis. But if Atlantis is 
simply a myth, it is nonsensical to suppose that A can be made its owner, with 
the power to evict others who enter it. As a matter of property law, the 
proposition simply does not compute. Again, however, this is not true for 
contract law. If A promises to take B to Atlantis, A may well be contractually 
obligated to do so. The law cannot force the promisor to do the impossible, but 
it can at least force him or her to pay damages in recognition of an actual duty 
to the person he or she promised.108 
Property rights exhibit the durability that contract rights lack because 
property law is designed to produce only results that are possible. In personam 
 
105. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 206, 206 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (“There is 
exactly one function bankruptcy law must serve. It must govern mutually insupportable 
obligations. . . . [B]ankruptcy law is property law.”). 
106. See Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 671 (1888) (“A court of chancery cannot decree 
specific performance of an agreement to convey property which has no existence, or to which the 
defendant has no title.”); see also Kiley v. Baker, 27 A.2d 478, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (holding that 
equity will not order specific performance of contract to convey realty where seller had entered into 
prior contract with third person, even if conveyance to third person has not yet taken place). 
107. Cf. BIRKS, supra note 86, at 49 (“A right in rem cannot survive the extinction of its res.”). 
108. See Taylor v. Caldwell, [1863] 122 ENG. REP. 309, 312 (Q.B.) (“There seems no doubt 
that where there is a positive contract to do a thing, not in itself unlawful, the contractor must perform 
it or pay damages for not doing it, although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the performance 
of his contract has become unexpectedly burdensome or even impossible.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266, illus. 9 (stating that a party may be held liable for breach of contract 
for failure to deliver an electronic device meeting contract specifications even though “it is not possible 
for any manufacturer, under the state of the art” to produce such a device). 
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rights, with their fundamentally abstract orientation, must be destructible. If the 
government promises to enforce all in personam obligations, its promise is a 
false one because, time and again, those obligations simply will be impossible 
to perform. But rights in rem are grounded in things and seek to reach all 
persons. Property law takes irreconcilable demands and imposes a solution that 
reconciles them as a matter of law. Not for nothing were property rights 
referred to as “real rights” in Roman and Medieval law—indeed, both the word 
“reality” and the word “realty” trace back to the Latin res.109 Property law is the 
law of that which actually is. Property law takes the impossibility inherent in 
mutually exclusive claims on resources as its starting point. Its defining 
function is to resolve that impossibility. As a result, property rights are durable 
in a way that in personam obligations are not. 
The other feature to observe about property rights is that they are 
“resilient.” It is not only the case that property rights, unlike other sorts of 
rights, in principle need not be destructible, but in a sense they cannot be 
destroyed. To be sure, no particular distribution of property rights is automatic, 
but so long as the property to which the rights attach exists, there is a sense in 
which it is inescapable that there be some distribution. 
It is easiest to see this in situations where the law is committed to treating 
a particular thing as private property. If the owner of the thing is divested of her 
ownership, someone else will become the owner in her place.110 But the 
resilience of property rights goes further. All property is necessarily controlled 
by some person or group of persons or institution, no matter what form that 
control takes.111 To say that a given item is unowned is to say in a sense that 
everyone owns it. Each person then has legal control over the question of his or 
her own use of the property. There may be a right to extinguish others’ claims 
by converting the property to private property, or there may not. There may be 
obligations not to consume more than a certain share of the property, or there 
may not. There may be obligations not to dispossess those currently in 
possession, or there may not. But authority to determine who may do what with 
 
109. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008). 
110. It is worth recalling the medieval position that someone must always be seised of land at 
any given moment. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 30 (3d ed. 2002). Originating in the necessities of feudal obligation, the 
principle can nevertheless be seen as a reflection of the view that control rights must always be 
allocated one way or another. 
111. By way of analogy, consider the law of corporate governance. Corporations law is in 
large measure centered on the idea of “control.” When a firm lacks a dominant shareholder, it is not 
that the firm is uncontrolled. Rather, control is said to be “in the market.” See Paramount Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990). Consider also the concept of political sovereignty, 
which, it has been suggested, displays similar properties of durability and resilience. See United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1936) (“Rulers come and go; governments 
end, and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure 
without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 69, at *156 (stating that sovereignty “must, in all governments, reside somewhere.”). Hence the 
ancient exclamation, “The King is dead—long live the King!” 
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Blackacre must be apportioned. With respect to every conceivable act 
involving every particular thing, the law must determine who will decide 
whether the act should occur. The results of those decisions are the substance of 
property rights. 
Legal control over resources is thus a zero-sum game.112 For this reason, 
abrogating one person’s rights in a given piece of property ordinarily does not 
destroy those property rights altogether. Abrogation instead transfers rights 
from that person to someone else. If property rights are taken away, but the 
property remains, the rights still lurk. Who the recipient is should not ordinarily 
be hard to ascertain. We simply have to ask: Who now decides how the 
property is to be used? There is a sense in which there is always an allocation 
of property rights in every extant thing because, as a formal matter, property 
rights are simply a description of whose claims to use a given resource in a 
certain way take legal priority at a given point in time. Just as property law by 
its nature does not permit allocation of more than 100 percent of the ownership 
among the universe of possible owners, it does not allow an allocation of less 
than that. Like in a carnival whack-a-mole contest, the denial of a property 
right here means a new property right pops up there. This is what is meant by 
property’s resilience. So long as a thing exists, the law will have to decide, 
whether it admits so or not, who shall determine how the thing will be used. 
C. The Persistence of Property 
If property rights cannot be destroyed outright so long as the property to 
which they attach exists, then the only way to destroy property rights is to 
terminate the underlying property’s existence. There can be no allocation of 
control in a thing that does not exist, after all—one cannot own a nonentity.113 
But destroying property rights in this way is not so easily done. With one 
important exception, the law cannot altogether annihilate a piece of property. 
For purposes of this analysis, there are two ways a thing might cease to 
exist. First, there is the termination of legal existence, a situation where the law 
refuses any longer to treat a particular thing as having any being. If the thing 
continues to exist in actual fact, however, this legal extinguishment is really a 
kind of conceptual reshuffling. Since the thing is still around, the law will still 
have to deal with the question of control. Thus if the law suddenly declares 
that, as far as it is concerned, there simply is no Blackacre anymore, 
Blackacre’s owner has lost rights in Blackacre while former would-be 
trespassers have gained them. The property rights live on, even if they are not 
acknowledged as such. 
 
112. I do not mean to suggest it is zero-sum as a matter of economic efficiency or utility, only 
as a matter of formal entitlements. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Zero-Sum Madison Private Property and 
the Limits of American Constitutionalism, 90 MICH L. REV. 1392 (1992) (critiquing the suggestion that 
property is a zero-sum in welfarist sense). 
113. See BIRKS, supra note 86, at 49–50. 
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Alternatively, a thing might cease to exist as a matter of fact. Here we are 
faced with the termination of a phenomenon external to law, rather than the 
law’s symbolic representation of such a phenomenon. This is generally not 
something law can bring about. While the law may cease to recognize a 
phenomenon’s existence, it cannot, as a general matter, thereby eliminate that 
phenomenon from the world. Start with nonmaterial things, the objects of 
intellectual property law: it is hard to see how a symphony or a technical 
process—not a physical representation of the idea expressed but the idea 
itself—might be snuffed out. If one takes a Platonic view of such things, their 
existence is in a sense perpetual. If one imagines that poems and the like exist 
only so long as someone knows or thinks them, then they exist until they are 
forgotten, a result government would seem to need something like a mind-
erasing machine to accomplish. 
It is likewise hard to see how physical space, the starting point for real 
property, can be destroyed.114 The amount of physical space to which a given 
property right entitles a person might change, if, say, that space is defined in 
relation to boundary markers that move over time.115 Likewise a portion of 
space might become less valuable—it might not be worth much to own the spot 
where a penthouse apartment used to sit before razing of the building in which 
it was located. But, at least within the confines of Newtonian physics, the 
quantity of physical space around us is fixed. Only its apportionment changes. 
The situation may seem more complicated when it comes to physical 
objects. As a matter of ordinary language, we are accustomed to speaking of 
things being destroyed.116 But this is not destruction of the kind sufficient to 
extinguish property. As Christopher Newman observes, “At any given moment 
in time, we identify a specific thing as a specific quantity of some material, 
composed of a specific set of subparticles of matter and having a specific 
form.”117 And the principle of the conservation of matter tells us that matter 
cannot be destroyed, only rearranged. If I own a painting that someone else sets 
on fire, the physical material constituting the painting will not cease to exist. It 
will simply be changed to ashes and smoke. Property law is still prepared to 
address the status of that material: because the material is mixed with the other 
particles and gas of the atmosphere, and because the atmosphere is the common 
property of all people, the physical matter has become a part of that commons. 
The change in form has led to a rearrangement of property rights. It is as 
 
114. See ALBERT KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 336 (1928) (describing land as “purely a 
geometrical idea”). 
115. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010). 
116. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 792–94 (2005) 
(stating that “property destruction is harder to define than it appears at first glance” and offering 
illustrations of different conceptions of destruction). 
117. Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 55 VILL. L. REV. 
251, 272 (2011). 
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though I owned a pond that was then emptied into a public reservoir. Though 
the pond is gone, the water is not, and while the water no longer belongs to me, 
property law still assigns it to someone. 
This is no mere technicality or obscure ontological exercise. It reflects a 
view that pervades property law, albeit largely without conscious recognition. 
A dramatic alteration in a given item’s form sometimes triggers a change in 
property rights, but often does not.118 A person still owns an egg after 
transforming it into an omelet, for instance. Form operates to identify and 
segregate a particular group of materials from others, and it can provide 
continuity when one bit of material is substituted for another.119 But changing 
the form of material, which is what physical destruction of an object 
accomplishes, does not avoid the property problem. It is simply a conceptual 
event that may or may not effect a change in rights to the materials captured 
within the form. 
There is one kind of res that is genuinely capable of being destroyed, 
however: an in personam legal right. Legal rights are elements of positive law 
that, by definition, derive their existence from law. If a legal right is revoked as 
a matter of law, it ceases to exist. And when a legal right ceases to exist, 
property rights attaching to it cease to exist as well. No one can own it because 
there is no longer any “it” to own. 
Not all legal rights are capable of destruction in this way. As already 
discussed, ordinary property rights—property rights attaching to things other 
than laws—are resilient. When the law negates one person’s legal authority to 
control a particular thing’s use, it necessarily vests a corresponding degree of 
control in someone else. For this reason, law cannot destroy property rights in 
extant things without transferring property rights to another person or body of 
persons. But law can extinguish other kinds of legal rights, and it can do so 
without transferring property rights. When an in personam obligation is 
nullified, no property rights are transferred. To be sure, the former duty bearer 
receives a benefit at the expense of the former right holder. But since the 
nullified right was not itself a property right, the benefit received is not a 
property right. And since the right has been nullified, the former duty bearer is 
not now the owner of the thing that the right holder used to own. That thing, the 
right, no longer exists. 
Property rights attached to personal legal rights are thus a special kind of 
property. Unique among property rights, they are in certain circumstances 
capable of being destroyed without giving corresponding property rights to 
others. Objects are capable only of being reformed and reshaped, not 
 
118. See id. 
119. Thus a person may own a body of water, even if the molecules that make up the body are 
constantly changing. 
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extinguished, and as a result, their destruction always requires an allocation of 
property rights one way or another. 
III. 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Having undertaken a general examination of property as a matter of legal 
theory, it is time to return to the specifically constitutional problems presented 
by takings and due process doctrines. The understanding of property this 
Article has developed can be adapted for constitutional use without great 
difficulty, though in some cases it will admittedly be much harder to apply the 
rule than to state it. The question a court should ask to determine whether a 
person is asserting a property right protected by the Constitution is whether the 
person was granted legal authority, under a given set of circumstances or at a 
particular point in time, to control some aspect of the way a particular, 
identifiable thing is used—authority that could be asserted against anyone else 
seeking to control that aspect of the thing’s use. In everyday language, the 
question is whether there is something that legally belonged to the person. Was 
there something that was hers, in whole or in part? 
On this definition, a legal right to receive money from a welfare agency, 
to attend a public school, or to be employed by a government agency is not a 
property right. There is no object or entity, tangible or otherwise, nor is the 
entitlement a relationship availing against the world at large. But such a legal 
right is an object of property to which a property right attaches. It is an 
identifiable thing that belongs to the holder of the right. To deny a person such 
a right is, therefore, also to deny a property right. Property is at issue whenever 
a person is alleging government impairment of a legal right belonging to her. 
Even though the underlying legal right is not itself a property right, its holder 
may still invoke the secondary property right that she also holds in the 
underlying right. 
Supreme Court decisions do not seem to have conceptualized “new 
property” in this way. That is to be expected, since the Court’s failure to treat 
property consistently in constitutional doctrine is the very problem this Article 
means to resolve. Still, this Article’s goal is to harmonize the divergent aspects 
of prevailing law, not to bulldoze the constitutional landscape. The fear 
animating Merrill and others is that a single definition of property applicable to 
all constitutional doctrines will produce results that are neither “normatively 
defensible” nor consistent with prior decisions.120 This concern must be taken 
seriously.121 If the Takings Clause must have a narrower compass than the Due 
Process Clauses, the argument goes, a single definition of property for all of 
them will therefore either overextend takings protection or underextend due 
 
120. Merrill, supra note 19, at 956. 
121. Id. 
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process. The flaw in this argument is the unstated minor premise that takings 
cannot be narrower than due process if property is defined the same way for 
each. As the next Section will show, the reconceptualization of constitutional 
property proposed here should not precipitate any dramatic change in the 
results that the prevailing approach has already produced. 
A. Deprivations and Takings 
While “property” is an element common to the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses, the kind of protection extended to holders of property rights by those 
provisions is not. For one thing, they impose different constraints on 
government—hearings, monetary compensation, and so on—when it interferes 
with property. More importantly for our purposes, the different protections the 
Clauses provide are triggered by different kinds of impairments of property 
rights. Due process comes into play if a person is “deprived” of property, while 
the just compensation and public use requirements come into play if a person’s 
property is “taken.” This linguistic difference suggests the possibility of an 
approach that distinguishes between different forms of interference with 
property. 
The connotations of the verbs “to take” and “to deprive” are different in 
an important sense.122 Deprivation entails any act that prevents a person from 
enjoying something he or she otherwise would have enjoyed. It is a state of 
privation, and it may affect everyone equally without benefiting anyone. 
Taking, at least in its primary sense, has a narrower meaning. To take 
something entails more than interference with enjoyment. When something is 
taken it is transferred from one person to another such that one person gains 
what the other loses—hence the usual opposition of “give and take.”123 
 
122. In his article on constitutional property, Merrill acknowledged that “[t]o deprive someone 
of property has a broader range of meanings” than “[t]o take property,” but suggested that this 
difference supports attributing different meanings to the word “property”—something of a non 
sequitur. Merrill, supra note 19, at 983–84. If the ways language differs from provision to provision 
deserves attention, so too do the ways in which language stays the same. 
123. Others have made similar observations about these terms. See John Decker Bristow, E. 
Enters. v. Apfel: Is the Court One Step Closer to Unraveling the Takings and Due Process Clauses?, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1547 (1999) (“The word ‘taken’ indicates a deprivation on the part of the 
property owner as well as a benefit or receipt by the government.”); John D. Echeverria & Sharon 
Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. 
L. REV. 695, 710 (1993) (noting that “the Takings Clause appears, on its face, to be narrower in scope, 
triggered not merely by the owner’s deprivation, but by some kind of appropriation of the property by 
the government as well.”). As Roger Clegg puts it: 
“Taken” is a narrower and more specific verb than “deprive,” which appears in the 
immediately preceding clause in the Fifth Amendment. . . . This is because “taken” 
connotes property leaving one person’s hands and becoming the property of another. 
Deprivation has no such connotation. Thus if a right in the property owner’s bundle is 
simply extinguished, it might plausibly be argued that, while a deprivation has been 
effected, a taking has not. 
Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (1995). Clegg, 
however, goes on to argue that there is “great deal of logic in insisting on payment of just 
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Applying this view to the constitutional text suggests that depriving a person of 
property, whether for substantive or procedural due process purposes, ought to 
mean the person is denied a claimed property right. Taking property, by 
contrast, ought to refer only to situations where a property right is transferred 
from one person to another.124 
This reading is supported by a number of other considerations. For one 
thing, there is the surrounding text. The Takings Clause speaks of taking 
property “for public use,” suggesting the Clause is implicated only when 
someone else—the public—receives rights in the property at issue.125 There is 
no similar language in the Due Process Clauses. 
A reading along these lines also finds some support in evidence of 
eighteenth-century usage. The 1789 edition of Thomas Sheridan’s popular 
 
compensation when the government has taken private property and is itself using it, and in not 
requiring such payment when the government has simply outlawed the use of the property.” Id. at 543; 
see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1079–80 (1993). Clegg is right to focus on use 
by another as a prerequisite for a taking, but what he fails to appreciate is that, strictly speaking, 
outlawing the use of property shifts the right to decide how the property shall be used from its owner to 
the government. Deciding how not to use property is as much a use as deciding how it shall be used. (It 
appears that Clegg would recognize the concept of regulatory takings only when those regulations are 
something like the equivalent of an affirmative equitable servitude, but not when they resemble a 
negative one.) If the government seizes private property simply to set it aside as a nature preserve that 
no one would be permitted to enter, it would still seem like an appropriation of the sort the Takings 
Clause protects against. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). At any rate, his 
observation that both the text and the logic of the Takings Clause require some kind of transfer of 
ownership prerogatives is sound, even if his conception of those prerogatives is too cramped. 
Bristow, meanwhile, argues that the Takings Clause should only apply where the government 
transfers private wealth to itself and not where it transfers property rights from one private party to 
another. See Bristow, supra, at 16, 47–48. This reading is perverse, given the hostility of the Founders 
to “special” legislation that transfers property between private parties. Moreover, it radically 
undermines the logic of the Court’s willingness to uphold such transfers, namely, that they have a 
sufficiently public purpose and therefore are not naked A-to-B transfers. See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it 
is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation.”). 
124. Dean Treanor unintentionally acknowledges this when he writes: 
If I tell my daughter Katherine that she cannot play with her ball in the apartment, she will 
not accuse me of having “taken” her ball (or of having “taken” anything else, for that 
matter). She has been deprived of something of value to her: there is nothing she likes better 
than playing ball in the apartment. But we don’t think of this prohibition as a taking of 
property. 
William Michael Treanor, Supreme Neglect of Text and History, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1059 1067–68 
(2009). Treanor’s point is not to distinguish takings from deprivations, but to argue that takings must 
involve physical possession. In that respect, it is worth noting that his characterization is not entirely 
accurate, since what Katherine loses is her right to use the ball, not just the ball. Simply as a matter of 
ordinary usage, it seems strained to imagine that takings must involve physical possession. One person 
can take property from another without ever physically possessing it by, for instance, embezzling 
money, copying an idea, or passing fraudulent documents in order to secure title to the other’s 
property. At any rate, Dean Treanor is certainly right that the Constitution’s actual choice of verbs is 
important when he observes that there is a reason we refer to the “Takings Clause” and not the 
“Property Clause.” See William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 634 (2008). 
125. To be sure, there are senses of the verb “to take” that do not require a transfer, but as 
Clegg notes, the phrase “for public use” makes them especially unapt glosses on the meaning of the 
Takings Clause. See Clegg, supra note 123, at 536. 
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dictionary defines the verb “to take” as “to receive what is offered, to seize 
what is not given, to receive with good or ill-will; to lay hold on, to catch by 
surprize [sic] or artifice; to make prisoner” and it defines a “taking” as 
“seizure” and “distress.”126 These are all acts or circumstances in which the 
emphasis is as much on one person’s gaining a thing as on another’s loss of it. 
In contrast, Sheridan defines the verb “to deprive” as meaning “to bereave of a 
thing; to put out of office.”127 Here the emphasis is on loss, no matter how it 
comes about, rather than on appropriation by another. Sheridan’s definition is 
particularly helpful for our purposes because he provides the case of a 
clergyman who loses his position as an example of a deprivation. A position in 
the Church of England was (and is) a government job, and the right to a 
government job is today considered “new property.” Under Sheridan’s 
definitions, revocation of such a right would be a deprivation but not a taking, 
at least if the position were not immediately awarded to someone else. 
This reading can also be justified in light of the perceived purposes of the 
Due Process and Takings Clauses and the received learning about their 
adopters’ outlook. The general concerns thought to animate the Due Process 
Clauses place primary emphasis on the injury to holders of property rights and 
focus much less on benefits received at the expense of property holders. 
Historically, for example, “due process of law” may have expressed separation-
of-powers principles, forbidding extralegal interference with property by 
government officials.128 In modern times, due process is said to forbid 
“arbitrary” government action.129 In situations where property claims are tested 
 
126. See THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th 
ed. 1789). 
127. Id. 
128. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation 
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, 272 (1985) (“[C]onsiderable historical 
evidence supports the position that ‘due process of law’ was a separation-of-powers concept designed 
as a safeguard against unlicensed executive action, forbidding only deprivations not authorized by 
legislation or common law.”); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 
VA. L. REV. 493, 511, 522 (1997). It should be noted, however, that due process was often seen as a 
restriction on “partial” legislation—legislation that sought to redistribute as an end in itself. See, e.g., 
Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1874). 
129. See, e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ , 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (describing 
“protection of the individual against arbitrary action” as “the very essence of due process”). I leave 
aside those aspects of substantive due process incorporating what are considered fundamental 
freedoms that government cannot abridge, such as the rights articulated in the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution, although it might be possible to characterize these as “arbitrary” forms of 
government action too. Cf. James Y. Stern, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1509, 1554–56 (2008) (suggesting Lochner-era due process decisions may have been grounded 
in social compact theories that rendered certain government action restricting contractual freedom or 
redistributing property ultra vires and therefore “arbitrary”). Since these limitations are traditionally 
considered part of the “liberty” protected by the due process clauses, however, we may set them aside 
in the property context. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); see also Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (describing application of equal protection principles against 
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against general laws, due process requires safeguards like notice of any legal 
proceedings in which such determinations are to take place130 and an 
opportunity for those affected to make their case.131 Due process has also been 
seen as forbidding certain forms of retroactive legislation and as disallowing 
discretionary jury awards of punitive damages that significantly outstrip a 
plaintiff’s injury.132 Government may well find it profitable to act in a manner 
inconsistent with these principles, but the principles themselves do not require 
that government benefit at a property holder’s expense. The view of due 
process that emerges focuses on the legality or perceived fairness of the 
government’s treatment of the person as such. The concerns that may be said to 
animate due process protection are not limited to situations in which one party 
acquires property belonging to another.133 They come into play whenever the 
government denies a person’s claimed rights. 
The Takings Clause, by contrast, suggests a greater concern for benefits 
received at the expense of another. The Takings Clause has been thought to 
have roots in the reaction to practices like the British Army’s quartering 
soldiers and commandeering supplies during the Revolutionary War,134 the 
later confiscation of loyalist property, and the taking of land for the 
construction of public roads.135 These are all situations in which—consistent 
with “public use” language—ownership of property is transferred from one 
party to another. The Clause is founded on a simple quid pro quo notion of 
justice: government must pay for what it gets. 
The Takings Clause has also been thought to embody a principle of 
impartiality among the citizenry. Consider the proposition advanced during the 
founding generation that a law that “takes property from A. and gives it to B.” 
 
federal government via Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (so-called reverse incorporation) as a 
gloss on due process “liberty”). 
130. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Walker v. 
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115–17 (1956). 
131. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). 
132. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 269 U.S. 498, 548 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584–85 (1996); see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925) (“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 
N.E.2d 1115, 1142–46 (Ohio 2006) (finding eminent domain statute inconsistent with due process 
because it is excessively vague). 
133. In terms of doctrinal operation, due process does not disclaim any consideration of the 
benefits received at the expense of a person alleging a property right. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 
335. But those benefits seem more a reflection of limitations on due process protection, rather than of 
the kinds of situations that trigger due process concerns. 
134. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, app. at 305–06 (St. George Tucker ed., 
1803); see also Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-
Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1289–90 (2002). 
135. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 701–10 (1985). 
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violates “the great first principles of the social compact.”136 The Takings 
Clause was conceived by James Madison, who had been appalled by disregard 
for the “sanctity of property” evident during the post-Revolutionary period 
expressed in, for example, legislative measures designed to aid debtors at the 
expense of creditors.137 At the time the Takings Clause was ratified and 
throughout the nineteenth century, redistribution of property simply to benefit 
one private person at another’s expense was generally considered 
illegitimate.138 
There are echoes of these themes in modern takings decisions. The 
rationale underlying the “public purpose” requirement is said to be that “the 
 
136. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798); see also Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 658 
(1829) (“We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his 
consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union.”). 
Timothy Sandefur associates this principle with Madisonian ideas grounded in Locke:  
In republican theory, the power to take property for public use rests, not on the 
government’s right to exact support from subjects without their consent, but instead on the 
rights of all the people in the society. The majority may rightfully do only what the people 
can rightfully do unanimously. Since people have no right to steal from each other in the 
State of Nature, they cannot give government that right, or justify theft by compact.  
Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for 
Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use,” 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 584 (2003); see also Eric R. 
Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 893 (2004) 
(“[T]he social compact treats government as a partnership, and a partnership would defy its organizing 
principles if it forced one partner to sacrifice his property for the benefit of another.”). 
137. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 712 (Robert Allen Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1979); see also Treanor, supra note 
135, at 701–10. Treanor argues that although Madison was driven by antipathy toward legislation 
favoring unpropertied “factions” over the propertied and although he saw the Takings Clause as a way 
of instructing the people on the importance of property, he did not see the Takings Clause as a legal 
constraint upon redistributive measures. Id. at 711. It is enough for this Article’s purposes that such 
transfers are a concern the Takings Clause is meant to address, regardless of the mechanism by which 
it was meant to do so. We are not looking to reinvent the doctrinal wheel, and Madison’s personal 
intentions regarding the text are not controlling in any event. Treanor also contends that “[a]t times in 
his career . . . Madison appears to have moved beyond the position that redistributive consequences 
were a normal consequence of governmental actions, and to have favored government actions that had 
redistributive objects, if that redistribution accorded with republican ends.” William Michael Treanor, 
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 
844 (1995). But even if Madison unqualifiedly endorsed redistribution when it could be justified in 
republican terms, he would have remained opposed to redistributions that could not be so justified. I 
argue only that the Takings Clause should be understood to be concerned with at least some transfers 
of property rights, not necessarily all such transfers. 
138. See Shaun A. Goho, Process-Oriented Review and the Original Understanding of the 
Public Use Requirement, 38 SW. L. REV. 37, 76 (describing the Takings Clause as designed in part to 
prevent “taking the property of one person and giving it to another for no reason other than the 
government’s preference for the second person”). Some have challenged the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the “public use” provision of the Takings Clause. See Harrington, supra note 134, at 
1248 (arguing that the reference to public use was meant to distinguish compensable takings from 
noncompensable taxes, fines, and forfeitures). Even if Harrington is correct, however, it seems clear 
enough that there was general hostility to forced transfers of property from one person to another 
simply to advance the private interests of the recipient. For much of the nineteenth century, the A-to-B 
limitation was largely enforced as a matter of due process. See, e.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 
655, 663 (1874). 
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sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it 
to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”139 
Furthermore, although American law has a significantly redistributive 
component today, the Takings Clause is still accounted for as a way of ensuring 
that some members of society are not singled out to bear the burdens properly 
allocated to society at large.140 This benefits-and-burdens conception of the 
Takings Clause, like the A-to-B prohibition, makes the receipt of goods by 
some at the expense of others its organizing idea. As all these examples show, 
concerns about transfers pervade the way takings doctrine is understood. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there is already one sense in which 
“deprive” seems to have a broader meaning than “take[]” in the Constitution’s 
property clauses. There is no taking if a claimant was wrong about having any 
right to the property claimed—if, for example, a claimant litigates with his or 
her neighbor over the location of the boundary between their properties and 
loses.141 The claimant is nonetheless deprived of property because the claimant 
is denied an asserted property right. The claimant is entitled to whatever 
process is constitutionally due to prove the asserted claim.142 When a person is 
merely deprived of property by virtue of being judged not to be the property’s 
true owner, however, there is no takings problem because the deprivation does 
not transfer the property right to someone else—she never had it to begin with. 
And there is at least one other way in which the category of actions 
constituting constitutional deprivations of property is broader than the category 
constituting takings. A deprivation-without-taking can also occur if a person 
holds a valid property right but the underlying property disappears, resulting in 
the loss of property rights without a corresponding gain to anyone else. In most 
cases, this second scenario would seem impossible. As this Article has shown, 
to terminate one person’s property rights in such property is to confer new ones 
 
139. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477, 480 (2005). 
140. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (“The Just Compensation 
Clause was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”) (citation omitted). 
141. Thus the otherwise fractured Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), was in complete agreement that a 
judicial decision “consistent with . . . background principles of state property law” cannot be a taking. 
Id. at 2611–12. 
142. See id. (accepting applicability of procedural due process); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (stating that “the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it 
does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions” and concluding student 
suspended from school without necessary hearing would be denied property without due process of 
law even if suspension was legally proper); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972) (“It is enough to 
invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at 
stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing . . . .”). One might view this as simply an epistemic 
problem, inasmuch as the validity of the claim cannot be determined until there has been as much 
process as would be appropriate if the claim were indeed valid. This understanding is undercut, 
however, by the availability of damages for the denial of due process even where the underlying claim 
is ultimately shown to be meritless. See Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266–67. 
       
2013] PROPERTY’S CONSTITUTION 317 
on someone else—another person or persons, government, or the public at 
large. If the property exists, then property rights exist, and, ordinarily, 
government cannot terminate the existence of the property itself. But again, the 
property right one has in one’s legal rights is an exception to this rule. Positive 
legal rights, unlike all other things that can be owned, are created and sustained 
by law. Thus, while the government’s decision that A no longer owns Blackacre 
necessarily requires that the rights A once enjoyed shift to someone else’s 
hands, its decision that A is no longer entitled to receive welfare assistance does 
not transfer A’s legal right to someone else. No property right remains because 
there is no property, no res, left to speak of. The property—A’s legal claim 
upon the government—ceases to exist, and with it, A’s property right in the 
claim. A is deprived of A’s right to welfare, but A’s right is not taken. 
Given this reading, there is no need to manipulate the meaning of 
“property” to avoid claims for compensation when entitlement schemes are 
reformed, government employment ended, and so on. The termination of a 
legal entitlement triggers due process, consistent with the legacy of the due 
process revolution of the 1970s. But it does not give rise to a takings claim 
since there has been no redistribution of property rights. 
Note, however, that this conclusion is not limited to “new property” 
entitlements. It holds for any in personam obligation.143 Thus, for example, 
while the government’s determination that the owner of an unsecured bond 
must give it to someone else would constitute a taking, the government’s 
decision that the bond is simply void would not. There might be a possible 
claim for restitution of any property provided as consideration, if it can be 
traced.144 But as a general matter, extinguishment of an in personam right 
removes property from the picture. Note, too, that “new property” does receive 
takings protection in certain situations. Even if a legal right is purely in 
personam, it is still “taken” if it can be said to have been assigned to someone 
else, rather than being revoked altogether. On this view, there is as much a 
taking when the government transfers A’s taxi medallion to B as when it 
transfers B’s corporate bonds to A. If the right still exists, but it now belongs to 
someone else, the Takings Clause is implicated. 
B. Some Objections and Some Replies 
There is no magic formula that will unravel the many mysteries of 
property law’s complex architecture. The approach proposed here does not 
 
143. This raises an important point about the imposition of personal liability. So long as such 
liability is abstract and does not create rights to any asset in particular, there is no transfer of property 
rights that occurs and thus no taking. Because the person subject to the liability has lost the right not to 
have to pay the person to whom she has suddenly become indebted, a right to which she had a property 
claim, she has suffered a deprivation. 
144. Cf. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 623–24 
(2000) (awarding restitution as a matter of contract law where federal government repudiates contract). 
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purport to assimilate property perfectly, even as a purely formal institution, let 
alone a social one, into the framework of constitutional law. That said, in a 
world of least-worsts, the forgoing marks an improvement over the status quo 
and provides a measure of theoretical and analytic consistency that has so far 
been absent. In this regard, it is important to address the principal objections to 
the constitutional property framework proposed here. I will discuss three such 
challenges. 
1. Analytic Error 
The first potential objection is that the argument is mistaken as an analytic 
matter. Termination of an in personam right, a critic might argue, is as much a 
transfer of rights between parties as is a reassignment of ordinary property 
rights. Declaring that an unsecured in personam debt is unenforceable, for 
example, relieves the debtor of a debt at the expense of the creditor.145 
This response rests upon a flawed analogy to property rights. Consider a 
typical breach of contract suit. If A sues B for $100 in damages and loses, A 
does not then owe $100 to B. The opposite of B’s having a duty to pay A $100 
is not A having a duty to pay $100 to B; it is simply B’s not having a duty to 
pay $100 to A.146 A would have a duty not to try and appropriate $100 from B, 
but that duty is the creation of property law, not contract. It is simply the 
backdrop against which the law of contract operates, and when the law of 
contract ceases to operate, the background is all that remains. B has rights in 
rem to his or her possessions, including bank accounts, and that right is as good 
against the rest of the world as it is against A. But from the standpoint of 
contract law, there is nothing more to be said. Contract law is essentially 
personal and transactional, and if there is no transaction, there is no contract 
right. 
The structure of property law is quite different. Imagine a garden-variety 
ownership dispute—an argument over the location of the border between lands 
owned by two neighbors, or a homerun baseball caught by one spectator only 
after another one dropped it, or a jewel lost by its owner and found by a 
chimneysweep. In these sorts of situations, an affirmative and exclusive right of 
control will be assigned to one party with a corresponding duty of obeisance 
placed upon the other. The question is, who gets the right? There is no doubt 
that someone will. If the right, by its terms, ought to be held by one party but is 
instead given to the other, it has been transferred. 
Not all property disputes involve ownership contests, of course, and 
another way of framing the analytic objection thus arises. A critic who accepts 
 
145. Cf. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) 
(1821) (“[J]us ad personam in its essence is jus ad rem, rem being taken here in its general sense as 
anything external to my freedom, including even my body and my life.”). 
146. See Hohfeld, supra note 82, at 710 (positing “no-rights” as the “jural opposite” of 
“claims”); see also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 19 (1990). 
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that no transfer occurs when in personam rights are extinguished might argue 
that, by the same token, no transfer occurs when ownership rights are 
invalidated—that is, when private property is made public. This again 
overlooks the difference between property and other kinds of rights. It is true 
that if Blackacre, the property of O, is suddenly declared common property or 
res nullius, O ceases to be the owner without anyone else becoming the owner 
in O’s stead. Ownership, in the sense of a right of undivided control over 
Blackacre, has indeed disappeared. But Blackacre has not. And legal control 
over Blackacre still exists, even though it is now dispersed thinly and widely. 
The rest of the world, in the aggregate, has benefitted at O’s expense—not in 
monetary value or utility, but in rights. The rights it has acquired, and the rights 
O has lost, are property rights, rights to determine what is to be done with 
Blackacre. A transfer of property rights has still taken place. This is the 
principle of resilience. While in personam obligations vanish in a puff a smoke 
when the government declares them unenforceable, property rights just change 
hands. There is no escaping the problem of allocation so long as there is a thing 
to be allocated. 
2. Overlooking Value 
A second general objection to the scheme proposed here is that it gives the 
Takings Clause too little reach by inadequately accounting for value, wealth, or 
material welfare.147 What matters, it might be argued, is not whether a person 
has been denied a right with the formal characteristics of an in rem relationship, 
but that the person has been made materially worse off.148 Thus the Takings 
Clause should protect new-property government benefits or private law in 
personam rights like those arising from contract law, or perhaps both. 
Individuals rely on such rights, and those reliance interests should not be 
disrupted. Moreover, to the extent the rights at issue resemble common law 
private rights, failure to extend them takings protection undermines incentives 
to maximize social wealth and strips individuals of what they have justly 
earned. 
It is true that value is an important aspect of property law. A person’s 
material welfare largely derives from the sum total of all that belongs to him, 
including whatever in personam rights he has. Although a property right does 
not guarantee value to its holder—ownership of worthless property is 
worthless—a property right is generally a precondition to appropriating value 
where it does exist. 
 
147. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
531, 604–05 (2005) (arguing for “value theory” of property in takings law). 
148. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (1992) (“Legal niceties such 
as in rem and in personam mean little to individuals faced with losing important and/or valuable 
assets.”). 
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The approach outlined here does not eliminate value from the takings 
inquiry. Market value can and does serve as a way to distinguish between 
alterations of property rights that rise to the level of compensable takings and 
those that do not.149 It also provides the basic metric for determining just 
compensation.150 More to the point, since property rights are the vessel in 
which much wealth is stored, protecting property rights in the manner described 
here does much to protect personal value. All property other than in personam 
rights is invariably protected by the Takings Clause,151 and in personam rights 
are still protected against reallocation. 
But while this approach by no means excludes value, welfare, wealth, and 
the like from the equation, such considerations are not the appropriate 
touchstone for constitutional property doctrine. Property—the body of rules 
concerning ownership, use, and possession of things—is distinct from personal 
well-being, even if it is closely related. As a result, there are manifold 
difficulties with an approach centered on value. 
Value standing alone is a wholly unsatisfactory foundation for takings 
law. As an initial matter, it is worth noting the text of the Takings Clause 
makes it clear that a taking of private property is permissible if just 
compensation is provided, implying that compensation does not negate or undo 
a taking. Compensation, in other words, is a substitute for the property that is 
taken, not property itself. The Takings Clause conceives of property as rights in 
actual things, not rights to their value. Current doctrine reflects this outlook. 
Government action that causes a drop in the market value of an asset without 
infringing formal property rights generally cannot support a takings claim.152 
The Supreme Court has also been clear that terminating government benefits 
does not trigger takings protection, no matter how valuable those rights may be 
to their recipients.153 And the “entitlements” approach to property that has 
guided the due process revolution since Roth would be incompatible with an 
understanding of property as value or welfare simpliciter.154 
 
149. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
150. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).  
151. How much protection is another question. See supra note 31. 
152. See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (finding that an 
impairment of market value was not a taking); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28 n.14; Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 
(1973); Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1266–75 (2010) 
(describing the “persisting leitmotif in U.S. property law, by which formal property rights, and not 
value, are the subject of legal protection”).  
153. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 174 (1980); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 
(1960); Merrill, supra note 19, at 958 (“[W]hen the courts have been confronted with claims that ‘new 
property’ interests such as Social Security or welfare benefits are entitled to substantive constitutional 
protection, those claims have been rejected out of hand.”). 
154. Cf. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584–88 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing against entitlements test). 
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But more than doctrine and practice stand in the way. Conceiving of 
property as economic value or well-being makes the constitutional question 
wholly dependent on a potentially complex empirical determination, requiring 
the kind of inquiry courts are poorly situated to conduct, and, what is more, a 
determination subject to constant fluctuation.155 Indeed, making value the focus 
of constitutional property conflicts with notions of judicial competence and the 
separation of powers limitations in a fundamental way. If any government 
policy that has significant negative economic consequences for a person is a 
taking regardless of whether it abridges his or her legal rights, it appears the 
Takings Clause obliges government to maximize every person’s material 
circumstances at every possible moment. Judicial policing of this obligation 
would amount to a kind of perpetual second-guessing of every government 
policy on grounds, essentially, of their wisdom. Such an understanding quickly 
descends into absurdity. Insofar as government policies generated inflation and 
thereby reduced the value of a person’s cash, for example, a pure value 
conception of constitutional property would presumably require government to 
compensate for that lost value, thereby requiring more cash and producing 
more inflation. All of which is to say that value alone cannot structure the way 
constitutional property is conceived. 
What about a less radical version of the value objection? A critic might 
accept a requirement of demonstrating the infringement of a preexisting 
entitlement or “vested right,” but insist that any such impairment be treated as a 
taking, regardless of whether it entails the transfer of property rights from one 
party to another. This approach uses legal entitlements as a proxy for value. 
Some measure of formalism is restored, but individual material welfare remains 
the central idea. 
While somewhat less dramatic in consequence, this view would still 
entitle any recipient of government benefits to just compensation in the event of 
a benefits termination, a result current doctrine rules out.156 It also seems 
inconsistent with the standard rationales for the Takings Clause to the extent it 
prevents changes in property rights altogether. The just compensation 
requirement, for example, is said to force government to internalize costs its 
policies impose on individuals or distribute the costs more widely.157 But in the 
case of new property, it does more than shift the costs of the government’s 
policy; it effectively prevents any change whatsoever. Similarly, if it is argued 
 
155. A similar principle operates in tax law: a taxpayer cannot claim a loss whenever the 
taxpayer’s property loses value; the property must be sold or otherwise disposed of for the loss to be 
realized. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Rev. Ruling 84-145, 1984-2 C.B. 
47. 
156. See supra note 153. 
157. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (The Takings Clause “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with 
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.”). 
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that the Takings Clause is meant to protect against reallocating social wealth, 
“new property” beneficiaries are on shaky ground; while termination of 
government benefits might be said to enrich the public at beneficiaries’ 
expense, the benefits themselves are by the same token forms of wealth 
redistribution. 
An even narrower variant of the value objection might concede a lack of 
takings protection for entitlements to government benefits, but nonetheless 
insist that the Takings Clause still protect in personam private rights, contract 
rights most especially. Again, however, this position cannot be squared with 
current doctrine. It should also be noted that while the Constitution bars states 
from “impairing the obligation of contracts,” it places no such limitation on the 
federal government.158 Instead, it explicitly gives Congress the power to 
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”159 In other words, the federal government has at least some power to 
impair in personam contractual obligations while states are already forbidden to 
do so.160 Takings protection for in personam contract claims arguably would 
negate a constitutionally conferred federal power and would be redundant as a 
limitation upon states. 
As it happens, in fact, Supreme Court doctrine concerning bankruptcy 
acknowledges something like the distinction between takings and deprivations 
urged here. There is no question creditors are entitled to due process in 
bankruptcy proceedings, no matter what the form of their claim against the 
bankrupt, but takings protection is available only where a creditor has a claim 
secured by a specific asset.161 As we have seen, destroying a security interest—
a right in rem applicable against the world, including subsequent purchasers—
would transfer the security holder’s property rights to the debtor or the debtor’s 
creditors and is properly viewed as a taking. An unsecured in personam 
obligation, however, though property, is not a property right and can be 
impaired without implicating the Takings Clause.162 
 
158. See Michael McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the 
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 292 
(1988) (stating that “the bankruptcy clause is evidence that the Framers believed national action 
impairing contractual rights might be necessary”). 
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
160. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (stating that “a chose in action is a constitutionally recognized 
property interest” and therefore entitled to due process protection); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (“[C]ontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken 
for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.”). 
161. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
162. For an overview of these issues, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 
FLA. L. REV. 851 (1999); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in 
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983). Bankruptcy claims—the rights against the bankrupt estate 
created by federal bankruptcy law—may themselves be seen as constitutional property. Cf. Joseph 
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This distinction is no empty formalism. Where distinct assets are 
concerned, the allocational function of property law is implicated, and secured 
claims can be honored without any need to discount them. Property law 
establishes something like a bankruptcy-style set of priority rules for control of 
each asset—as in, for instance, the complex rules governing the succession of 
future interests.163 True bankruptcy, by contrast, testifies to the reality that in 
personam obligations are often impossible to fulfill on their own terms, with 
the result that unsecured creditors can only be repaid in “little tiny bankruptcy 
dollars.”164 Their claims are personal, abstract, and contingent; when the debtor 
is insolvent, the government cannot accomplish what the debtor could not do—
it cannot extract blood from a turnip. Because it simply is not possible to avoid 
compromising these kinds of in personam obligations, they cannot be treated as 
property rights that entitle a creditor to compensation from the government if a 
debtor becomes insolvent. 
3. Accepting the Due Process Revolution 
A final objection to this Article’s approach to constitutional property is 
that it extends due process too far by treating “new property” as property. This 
argument could reflect a preference for contractual and other traditional in 
personam private rights, based on either utilitarian or moral understandings of 
private law.165 It could also arise from a judgment that procedural due process 
protection for government benefits is bad policy out of concern that it will drain 
resources that might otherwise be made available to beneficiaries.166 
Yet again, however, precedent stands in the way.167 And even accepting 
the proposition that a legal entitlement to receive “largess,”168 a “privilege,”169 
 
Pace, Note, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory to Abrogate 
State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1608–15 (2010) (discussing bankruptcy claims as 
property for procedural due process purposes). Indeed, they might be seen not only as entitlements, 
i.e., property, but as property rights if the bankruptcy estate as a whole is viewed as a res. See Adler, 
supra note 105, at 206. That would provide an important and valuable protection to creditors in 
bankruptcy. But it would differ significantly in consequence from the conclusion that unsecured 
contractual claims against the bankrupt are property rights. 
163. Cf. Honoré, supra note 71, at 126–28 (describing the “residuary” character of traditional 
ownership rights). 
164. In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 850 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
165. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government 
Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 13 (1983). It may also be that “old property” is a better vehicle for the 
protection of civil liberty than “new.” See id. For sophisticated variations on these ideas, see Ann 
Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 919, 
937–50 (2000). 
166. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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168. See Reich, supra note 11, at 733. 
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or a “gratuity”170 should be distinguished for constitutional purposes from other 
kinds of legal rights, the distinction is not always so easy to make.171 But more 
fundamentally, the position that traditional private rights may be treated as 
property while other entitlements may not presents difficulties from the 
standpoint of how due process is conceived. Whatever else due process may 
require, its most basic demand is simple legality—a person may not be stripped 
of property other than by the terms that positive law permits.172 “Vested rights” 
may be abrogated, but the rule of law demands that they not be abrogated 
except in accordance with a valid law authorizing abrogation. To the extent due 
process expresses this rule of law idea, there is a good argument that it applies 
to any individual entitlement, regardless of what it is that the beneficiary of the 
entitlement is entitled to. 
Madison wrote that “as a man is said to have a right to his property, he 
may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”173 In a sense, this 
statement points to an important analytic truth: what makes a legal right distinct 
from any other legal creation is that a right is owned by its holder, who alone 
decides how it is to be used. A person is legally connected to her rights in much 
the same way she is legally connected to the physical things she owns. Madison 
was not speaking of government benefits, of course, and he might well have 
disapproved of the modern welfare state. But he might also have accepted that 
valid legal rights are property, no matter their source or purpose. Although 
Madison considered slavery a moral evil, for instance, he nonetheless believed 
government manumission of slaves would take property rights from the slave-
owners, so that the former owners would be entitled to just compensation under 
the Takings Clause.174 
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also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
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Amendment that ‘No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
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173. James Madison, Property, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 
1999). 
174. Letter from James Madison to Robert J. Evans (June 15, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
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At any rate, the basic equilibrium established in modern constitutional law 
is one of neutrality toward the welfare state.175 Government benefits are neither 
constitutionally forbidden nor constitutionally compelled. Consistent with that 
equilibrium, and with a commitment to positive law as a way to avoid 
becoming mired in deep disagreements over distributional ethics, it may be 
appropriate to treat rights to government benefits as the right holder’s property, 
just like corporate bonds, bank accounts, and other in personam legal claims.176 
If the provision of public monies through individual entitlements is legitimate, 
then those entitlements are legal rights like any others. They should be viewed 
as property within the meaning of the Constitution’s property clauses and 
protected by the shield of due process from unlawful divestiture. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented a simple picture of property law that largely 
avoids engaging the profound disagreements among legal theorists—and 
society generally—concerning the just distribution of wealth. Property law is 
primarily about conflict over the use of resources. Property rights entail 
authority to decide how a given thing may be used and take the form of 
individual entitlements that come at the expense of all others. Incorporating this 
understanding into the constitutional framework provides a single, theoretically 
coherent definition of property for purposes of due process and takings 
doctrines. Notwithstanding the fears of the Supreme Court and commentators, a 
unified definition of property applicable in different constitutional areas is 
compatible with the results current doctrine produces. 
Property is a basic institution of law. It would be better to define it 
consistently across constitutional doctrines and to ground divergent 
constitutional results in sources of constitutional meaning that really do 
diverge, rather than to suppose property is one thing one moment and 
something else the next. Those who see too much takings property might do 
better to reconsider what constitutes a taking or just compensation;177 those 
who see too much due process property should focus on the meaning of a 
deprivation and the requirements of “due process of law.”178 
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The definition developed here is by no means complete,179 and the 
definition of property is only one of the significant issues that constitutional 
property doctrine raises.180 But the hope is that this account will encourage a 
clearer and more precise understanding in future attempts to delineate the scope 
of constitutional property. It also suggests what may be a better way to go 
about the task of interpreting the Takings and Due Process Clauses’ 
requirements. A renewed emphasis on doctrinal consistency and symmetry 
would support an approach that, in general, gives the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses a similar ambit, at least where text and precedent do not militate 
otherwise. Thus, in deciding whether the government’s action should trigger 
due process protection, one might ask whether the same action, if indeed 
wrongful, would support a takings claim. Likewise, in deciding whether 
government action constitutes a taking, one might ask whether that action 
should be subject to the strictures of due process. Consistency, in other words, 
may supply a route through the tangled maze of normative argumentation that 
surrounds the institution of property and reduce the occasions for unfettered 
moral theorizing. 
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